THE

ELEMENTS

OF

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

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PREFACE.

THE time has come when moral philosophy must obey the law which has, within the past half century, acted so powerfully upon the sciences, and speak the language of the people. Fifty or sixty years ago, moral philosophy had a brilliant epoch, insomuch as it was called the queen of the sciences; but since that time, its progress has been retarded. Meanwhile, the physical sciences have made a wonderful advance. One reason for this phenomenon is that the physical sciences have been popularized, while moral philosophy has spoken in the language of the universities.

Better results are accomplished with students in this branch of education by the topical, than by the Socratic method of instruction by questions and answers. The teacher of moral philosophy ought not to rest contented with asking a question and receiving an answer, perhaps in a monosyllable. Rather let him name a topic, and require the pupil to state in his own words what he

has learned. This plan will be found to be improving and scientific.

Many persons—even the young—already know what their duty is in a given sphere of action. Where they are not thoroughly informed, they need to be instructed; yet the chief thing is for them to be reminded of their duty over and over again, so that they may put it into practice. This truth must be kept in view constantly, if the grand object of instruction in moral science is to be attained. The student is both to know and do his duty; thus the problems in moral philosophy are impressed upon him with all the force of personal illustrations.

W. A. S.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER II.

FIRST TRUTHS.

CHAPTER III.

MORAL FEELINGS.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DESIRES.

CHAPTER V.

AFFECTIONS.

CHAPTER VI.

COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE.

CHAPTER VII.

VERACITY.

CHAPTER VIII.

FRIENDSHIP AND KINDRED AFFECTIONS.

CHAPTER IX.

THE WILL.

CHAPTER X.

CONSCIENCE.

CHAPTER XI.

THE ORIGIN OF VICE AND VIRTUE.

CHAPTER XII.

MAN'S RELATION TO GOD.

APPENDIX.

CHAPTER I.

THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY—DIVISION OF THE MENTAL POWERS—HARMONY—CAUSES BY WHICH THIS HARMONY IS INTERRUPTED—INTEREST OF THIS SCIENCE—SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE.

The Nature and Importance of Moral Philosophy.—The mental powers are divided into intellectual and moral: ethics, or moral philosophy, is the science of duty, and duty is anything that ought to be done.

Man is to be contemplated as an intellectual, and as a moral being. By his intellectual powers he acquires the knowledge of facts, observes their connections, and traces the conclusions which arise from them. These mental operations, however, even in a high state of cultivation, may be directed entirely to truths of any extrinsic kind—either to the moral condition of the individual, or to his relations to other sentient beings. They exist in the man that is so selfish that he cares for nothing, and for nobody but himself and his own good; he feels little beyond the personal wants, or the selfish enjoyments of the hour that is passing over him. But when we contemplate man as a moral being, new relations open on our view, and these are of mightier import. We find him occupying a place in a great

system of moral government, in which he has an important station to fill and high duties to perform. The two parts of his mental constitution we perceive to be remarkably distinct from each other. The intellectual powers may be in vigorous exercise in him who has little feeling of his moral condition; and the moral feelings may be in a high state of culture in the man who, in point of intellectual acquirement, knows little beyond the truths which it most concerns him to know —those great but simple principles, which guide his conduct as a responsible being.

Intellectual philosophy teaches about the mind, and moral philosophy treats of the soul.

Division of the Mental Powers into Intellectual and Moral.—Man is to be contemplated as an intellectual, and as a moral being.

By his intellectual powers man acquires the knowledge of facts.

They may exist in an eminent degree in the man who lives only for himself, and feels little beyond the personal wants, or the selfish enjoyments of the hour that is passing over him.

But when we contemplate man as a moral being, new relations open on our view, and these are of greater import.

We find him occupying a place in a greater, or moral government, in which he has an important station to fill and high duties to perform.

We find man placed in certain relations to a great

moral Governor who presides over this system of things.

Man is possessed of powers which qualify him to feel these relations, and of principles calculated to guide him through the solemn responsibilities which attend his state of moral discipline.

In a well-regulated mind there is an intimate harmony or a coöperation between these two departments of man's nature.

Harmony That Ought to Exist between These Classes.—There is nothing so pleasant as to see harmony and friendship existing between the intellectual and moral powers.

Yet harmony and friendship should not merely exist between classes, but in all the faculties.

While I am speaking upon the subject of Harmony, I shall say something upon the subject of Association. In the class now to be mentioned, the associations are formed according to relations, which are local or casual. Thus a fact, a thought, or a mental impression is associated with the person by whom it was communicated, and is recalled to the mind when the place or person is seen, mentioned, or considered.

Some persons seem to form almost no other associations than those of this description.

When a place which they had visited, for example, is spoken of, they immediately relate, in connection with it, the persons whom they met there, incidents which occurred in their company, and opinions or statements

which were mentioned in conversation with them; and from this, perhaps, they may branch off to other circumstances relating to these individuals, their families, or connections.

These associations, however, often make a great impression on the mind.

Thus we avoid a place that is associated with some painful recollection.

Without harmony of the moral and intellectual powers there can be no perfect character. The intellectual faculties may be in a healthful state while the moral are not, or the moral faculties may be in a healthful condition while the intellectual are not; and, of course, no harmony will exist under these circumstances. But to form a perfect moral character, there should be perfect harmony in the intellectual and moral parts of our nature.

We must have a sound mind, in order to know and understand what God commands us to do. We need, also, a good, forgiving disposition, so that we can do our duty toward our fellow-men, and do unto others as we would have them do unto us.

Causes by Which This Harmony Is Interrupted, and Means of Counteracting Them. — It requires only slight observation to show us that a perfectly regulated mental condition does not exist in the generality of mankind.

Dr. Abercrombie does not enter into particulars in tracing the circumstances which bear upon producing

this mental derangement. Being surrounded by objects of sense, our minds are, of course, influenced by external things, and it is natural that some facts should escape our memory; but this would not be the case if the mind were left at liberty to recall its own associations.

We have two sources of knowledge, which will always be correct guides; these are the light of conscience and divine revelation. But some object to an appeal to the sacred writings; for they say it is a departure from the strict course of philosophical inquiry.

Interest of the Science of the Moral Feelings.—The subject of the moral feelings is one of intense importance. Its importance, then, of course, renders it difficult.

It suggests great powers and properties of the thinking principle. This leads us to think of a probable time when this body is dissolved, and our thinking and reasoning powers pass into a higher state of being, where they will still exercise their faculties—where the life of each individual can be brought up at one glance.

Could we realize such a mental condition, we should contemplate the impressions then made with feelings far different from those which influence us now.

This science must be considered as the highest of all our pursuits, the science which contemplates man with relation to God and eternal things.

In this great science we have two infallible guides which, if we heed them, will conduct us to the truth. These guides are conscience and divine revelation.

If, in investigating this science, we disregard the light of the Holy Bible, we shall resemble an astronomer who depends upon his unaided sight for things which can only be revealed to him by the most powerful telescope.

Peculiar Source of Knowledge Bearing upon it from the Light of Conscience and of Divine Revelation.—There are the lights of divine revelation. Some will consider an appeal to sacred writings a departure from philosophical method. This opinion is at variance with the truth.

Induction of sound philosophy, along with the dictates of conscience and the light of revealed truth, we shall find to constitute a harmonious whole.

The various parts tend to establish and illustrate each other. If, indeed, in any investigation of moral science, we disregard the light which is furnished by the sacred writings, we resemble an astronomer who would rely entirely on his unaided sight, and rejects those optical inventions which extend so remarkably his field of vision, and are to him a revelation of things not seen.

The Holy Bible spreads forth truths, the view becoming clearer and brighter the farther they are pursued, and the rays which illuminate the path converge in the throne of him who is eternal.

CHAPTER II.

First Truths in the Science of Moral Philosophy—Resemblance in Mental Philosophy and Ethics—Classification—The Nature and Quality of Actions—A Great First Cause—Moral Responsibility—Future Existence—Consequence of these First Truths.

First Truths in Moral Science.—The knowledge which we gain through our intellectual powers, may be divided into two classes; namely, knowledge which is acquired, and that which is intuitive; but we shall speak principally of the intuitive knowledge.

This knowledge is a part of the mental constitution, arising with a feeling of certainty in every sound mind. The convictions derived from this source seem to occupy the same place in the moral system that the intuitive articles of belief do in the intellectual. They do not admit of direct proofs by the process of reasoning. Intuitive knowledge is in itself more simple than anything by which it could be proved.

The intuitive convictions differ in different individuals, arising from the peculiarities of their own mental condition. When, therefore, we appeal to certain conditions in the mental constitution, our appeal is made to a mind which is neither obscured by depravity, nor bewildered by the refinements of a false philosophy.

These two elements must go together in every correct inquiry in moral science, and we would no more think of applying to a man in an opposite condition, in regard to the principles of moral truth, than we would to a maniac. By this intuitive knowledge, we have a perception of the nature and quality of actions, as just or unjust, right or wrong, and a conviction of duties which a man owes to other men. Every man, of course, expects the same offices from others, and on this expectation, is founded the precept, that we should do unto others as we would that they should do unto us. From this moral impression, there arises a conviction of the existence of a great moral Governor of the universe. A belief in this Being as the First Great Cause is derived by a simple step of reasoning, that every event must have an adequate cause.

First Truths in the Science of Moral Philosophy.—We have several first truths in the science of the moral feelings.

1st. We have perceptions of the nature of actions, to show whether they are just or unjust, and a conviction of certain duties which every man owes to his fellow-men.

2d. When this is fully impressed upon the mind, there arises the conviction of the existence of a moral Governor of the universe.

3d. A sense of moral responsibility; and,

4th. A belief in our existence in a future life.

There are certain truths laid down in the beginning

of every science, which are so plain that they do not admit of a proof; for anything used to prove them would be harder to understand than the principles to be proved; hence, we call them intuitive principles, or first truths. Thus, in geometry, we have axioms; such as, "Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other," etc. These first truths form the basis of the science. In moral philosophy, we also have first truths; we know that to injure any one, or give him pain is wrong; this knowledge is not acquired, but intuitive. If we violate one of these principles, it is readily seen how easily we violate another; we go on until we become wicked, and finally lost as a moral being. All the moral principles have some relations existing among them. Again, by observing these principles that we know are right, we are led on and on, until we become benevolent and useful to our fellow-men.

Resemblance between First Truths, or Intuitive Principles of Belief in Mental Philosophy and in Ethics.—In intellectual philosophy, we have certain principles, which are recognized by the common consent of mankind; they are called First Truths.

In moral philosophy, we also have first truths; they correspond with those of the intellectual science.

These truths, in both sciences, do not admit of being established by any process of reasoning; attempts of this kind have been made, but more harm than good has resulted from such attempts.

The only evidence we have of the existence of first truths, in both of these sciences, is an appeal to the consciousness of every sound, rational being.

They correspond to each other, and the first thing that we do in an investigation is to look for these truths. A person may become immoral, and these first truths in intellectual philosophy will remain sound, but the truths of the other sciences may be injured by a wrong process of the mind. If the thoughts are unholy, they will have a vicious influence upon the character, and these truths may finally be forgotten; at least, they will exert no influence.

Classification of First Truths in Moral Science.—The first truths in moral science are classed: 1st. A perception of the nature and quality of actions, as just or unjust, right or wrong, and a conviction of certain duties, as of justice, and kindness, which every man owes to his fellow-men. 2d. From this primary moral impression, there arises a conviction of the existence of a great moral Governor of the universe. Our sense of his moral attributes arises, with a feeling of equal certainty, when, from the moral impressions of our own minds, we infer the moral attributes of him who thus formed us. 3d. From these combined impressions, there naturally springs a sense of moral responsibility, that for the just performance of the duties which are indicated by the conscience, man is responsible to the Governor of the universe. 4th. From this

chain of moral convictions, it is impossible to separate a deep impression of continued existence.

Perception of the Nature and Quality of Actions.—A perception is noticed of the nature and quality of actions, as just or unjust, right or wrong, and a conviction of certain duties; as, of justice, veracity, and benevolence, which every man owes to his fellow-men. Every man, in his own case, expects the same offices from others; and on this feeling is founded the precept, which is felt to be one of universal obligation, to do to others as we would have others do to us.

There are rules given us, and they are briefly stated here, in reference to the place which they hold as first truths.

In applying to these important articles of belief the name of first truths, some persons ascribe to them the nature of innate ideas.

It appears to be a point of the utmost practical importance, that we should consider them as arising out of principles which form a part of our moral constitution; and it is in this way only, that we can consider them as calculated to influence the mass of mankind. But, notwithstanding all their truth and all their utility, it may be doubted whether they are to every one the foundation of his faith in another state of being.

Certain fixed and defined principles of relative duty appear to be recognized by the consent of mankind, as an essential part of their moral constitution, by as abso-

lute a conviction as that by which our bodily powers are recognized.

Conviction of the Existence and Attributes of a Great First Cause.—There exists, most certainly, in each human being, a conviction of certain duties; as, benevolence, justice, etc., which are due him from his fellow-beings; and in return, of course, he is expected by others to perform the same offices.

From this first moral impression the very natural result is a conviction and belief in a great moral Governor.

And the cause of our belief in this greater and purer Being, is clearly shown by mankind, and a survey of nature in its wonderful works. Our certainty of God's existence becomes stronger, as we view man's moral impressions, and then think of Him who created man. And when these thoughts are gathered together, they make us feel a moral responsibility; that is, we believe that, according as man performs the many duties dictated by his moral conscience, he is responsible, and must answer to the Great Creator and Governor of the universe.

In feeling thus, man must surely have sentiments also of awe and homage for this Great First Cause, very different from those which are due to his fellow-mortals. And at last, there is connected with these impressions, and inseparable from them, a belief in a state of happiness and moral reward beyond this present existence.

Conviction of Moral Responsibility.—There are certain first, moral principles, which arise in the mind of every man, on the slighest reflection; one of these is, the conviction of moral responsibility; that is, the conviction that, in the due performance of all our duties indicated by conscience, we are responsible to God; and farther, that we owe to Him a certain homage distinct from that which we owe our fellow-men.

Impressions of Future Existence.—There are certain impressions, which show that we shall have a future existence.

Some believe that when a man dies, he is no more; that there is no future existence. Others, that there is a future state, where all our thinking faculties, our feelings, and our soul still live, and are not destroyed by death.

The soul lives in this world, and in a world to come. Knowing this, we should be ready for the future.

Consequence of These First Truths.—The importance of these convictions of the existence and attributes of a Great First Cause and Moral Governor, of moral responsibility, and of future existence, as intuitive articles of belief, is clearly seen.

In our moral science, as well as in intellectual and other great sciences, there must be some established first truths, which admit of no argument, and afford no doubt. In moral philosophy, we have some important first truths, which, if we do not accept as such, all far-

ther investigation relating to this science is fruitless. The Supreme Being has furnished us with a power, by which, from the perception of nature, we may judge of actions as right or wrong, just or unjust; and from this, we are compelled to acknowledge a Great First Cause and Moral Governor as the author of our being. Man, going thus far in such a belief, must feel that he is responsible for his actions, when he knows that he has the power of distinguishing right from wrong. We must not deny a first truth, but accept it as a first truth. With these intuitive articles of belief, man is prepared to live, and to strive, in order to fit himself for a future and better state. Without these convictions, everything would be in a more corrupt condition than we now find it; there would be no desire to do anything good; for man is prone to evil.

CHAPTER III.

MORAL FEELINGS—THE DESIRES, THE AFFECTIONS, AND SELF-LOVE—THE HUMAN WILL—EXPLICATION—DELIBERATION—CONSCIENCE—MAN'S RELATION TO GOD.

Moral Feelings.—We have feelings which are intuitive, and others which come to us through our five senses. Conscience, however, is the principal of the moral faculties, placed in us by Deity, to guide us in all of our actions; and by it we are able to know right from wrong. Act as we may, conscience dictates to us what is just and what is unjust.

Our desires are those feelings which prompt us to act for our own good and pleasure, without always caring about the feelings of others; they are such as the desire for wealth, the desire for moral improvement, and so forth.

The affections lead us to act for the pleasure and benefit of others, regardless of our own comfort; they are such as benevolence and justice. All of these are moral feelings, which are regulated by conscience; that is, when it is allowed to rule. In many cases, however, the authority of conscience is disregarded.

Let us now attempt to make an analysis of man as a

moral being. In this analysis, the first thing to be considered is the action of man; for by this we judge his internal principles. But one action may proceed from several motives which are different in character. When we are capable of comprehending motives, we shall then be able to judge of man's moral character. The elements which constitute a sensible and responsible person are various; we may study them one at a time, and then take them together, remembering that while we are thus occupied, we are gaining a knowledge of ourselves.

There is a certain condition of the mind, in regard to things to be obtained. This is called desire. But when it is relative to actions towards others, it is affection. Then there is another condition, which is somewhat connected with both of these, and this is self-love. It influences us to seek protection for ourselves, and to try to obtain every thing that will be to our advantage. This principle is sound and good in its place, but when allowed to overreach its boundary, and gain too much influence over us, it becomes selfishness. Then a man can entertain very little affection for his fellow-beings. But there is still another element of man's nature, and that is the moral principle, which is known as conscience; this often requires a sacrifice of self-love, and thus prevents it from exercising a bad influence over man's affections. Self-love, in moderation, is right; but selfishness is wrong. Self-love makes us take proper care of ourselves, but it degenerates into selfishness when it becomes excessive.

The Desires, the Affections, and Self-Love. —When an object presents itself to our view, we may have a desire to obtain it, and if we have reason to believe that it is within our reach, we experience hope; if we think we can obtain it, we then have faith; if we do obtain it, the result is joy; but if not, we suffer disappointment and sorrow.

If we have an affection, we wish to be able to act in accordance with it. This is natural, and we suffer when our affections are not duly exercised. Seeing a prospect of satisfying an affection, we entertain hope. The reverse of this is despair.

We have a desire for an object, and an affection for a person. Sometimes we desire power; this is the desire of ruling. Again, we have a desire for society, and this is one of the most common desires; as almost every person wishes for society, in every condition of life, and in all stages of civilization. One of the greatest of the desires is that of moral improvement. We desire to be better than we are. This leads to the highest state of man, and it belongs to every state of society; every person should have a desire to improve his moral habits.

Now let us notice the affections. As the desires are calculated to bring some gratification to ourselves, the affections lead us to our relations to other men, and to a certain line of conduct which arises out of these relations. Our affections show themselves in a great many ways. Thus, for example, a mother proves her love for her child, when she watches day and night over its

sick-bed, and never stops to think about being tired, but continues showing her affection for her offspring.

Self-love. There has been some dispute respecting the term self-love, both as to its general propriety and as to the mental feelings which ought to be referred to it. There can be no doubt, however, that every person has some self-love, and hence all study their own interest, gratification, and comfort. While some people have self-love in a low degree, many carry it to an excess, or do not keep it under control.

The Human Will.—Simple volition, or the will, is that state of mind which immediately precedes action. If we will an act, the act follows, unless it is prevented by some restraint, or physical inability to perform the action. The will is regulated by fixed principles, and these principles are influenced by moral causes, as the affections and moral rectitude. The will is also influenced by attention, habit, knowledge, and reason. Divine aid is necessary to restore the will when it is impaired, and this is the province of faith.

Explication.—Man has a will, and it occupies an important place among his faculties. The will may be cultivated; that is, it may be turned away from things which are wrong, and directed towards those things which are right. The will is free, otherwise man would be little better than a machine. Now, since the will is free, man is responsible for his actions; he is

able to subordinate his will to that of God, and to choose that which is true, beautiful, and good.

Deliberation.—We sometimes deliberate in regard to an action, and nothing seems to prevent its performance; but when we take another thought, we reflect that if we do so, it will injure the good name that we have secured, or the favorable impression which we have made; perhaps, it will not benefit us much, and it may assist our fellow-men to a great extent; selfishness would not see others gain so much at our expense, and it would suggest the non-performance of the action. But in this case, we must be guided, not by selfishness, but by the principles of moral rectitude. In other words, we must do what we know to be right.

Conscience.—Conscience is our guide, and when we have no divine revelation to consult, it tells us the right way, and urges us to walk in it; hence conscience is a faithful monitor. "There has been much dispute respecting the name, the nature, and even the existence of the moral principle, as a distinct element of our mental constitution; but this controversy may probably be considered as allied to other speculations of a metaphysical nature, in regard to which a kind of evidence was sought of which the subjects are not susceptible. Without arguing respecting the propriety of speaking of a separate power or principle, we simply contend for the fact, that there is a mental exercise, by which we feel certain actions to be right and certain others to be

wrong. It is an element or a movement of our moral nature which admits of no analysis and no explanation." We have a proof of the existence of conscience as a distinct principle of the soul; because conscience has an influence over every person. Conscience should not be degraded by any power.

Man's Relation to God.—Undoubtedly man, as a moral being, is drawn into a close relation to his Maker, and he should follow the example that God has set for him as closely as possible. Besides, a person who is moral and obeys the divine law, recognizes his duty to improve his fellow-men by associating with them, and by setting a good example for them to follow. The moral relation of man to the Deity is intimate, and man's place in reference to his Creator should be, and is, his most important position. Hence, the first inquiry is, what should be the condition of a man's heart, in order to fill this position with propriety?

1st. He should cultivate a sense of the divine presence, and regulate his conduct thereby.

2d. Humble submission to Providence, as regulated by a Being of infinite power and wisdom.

3d. A sense of moral imperfection and guilt, with the humility and self-abasement which arise out of this feeling.

4th. A sense of gratitude and love towards the Deity, as the giver of all good, as our preserver and gracious benefactor.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DESIRES — ANIMAL PROPENSITIES — THE DESIRE OF WEALTH—AMBITION — ILLUSTRATION — EMULATION — THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY—OF ESTEEM—THE DESIRE OF KNOWLEDGE—KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE—MORAL IMPROVEMENT—THE DESIRE OF ACTION—REGULATION OF THE DESIRES.

The Desires.—We have a desire for any object when we wish to possess it, and think that the possession of it will make us happy. There are a great many desires; among which are the desire for society, the desire of reputation, the desire of wealth, of power, of friends, and of various other things. But the desires should be kept under our control; for when they are once allowed to have full sway, it will cause some trouble to restrain them. Two persons may have the same desire, but be prompted by entirely different motives. One person may have a desire for wealth; because he thinks that he could aid the needy. The other person thinks that if he were wealthy, his friends would love him more than they do under the present circumstances. We should exercise great care in directing our desires. They should tend towards something that will benefit some one. The objects of desire embrace all those attainments and gratifications which mankind

consider worthy of being sought after. The object pursued in each particular case is determined by the views, habits, and moral dispositions of the individual. In this manner, one person may regard an object as above every other worthy of being sought after, which to another appears insignificant and worthless.

Remark.—A person sees an object, wants it, and thinks it worthy to be sought after. The principles which regulate diversities in the desires, and consequently form one of the great differences in human character, belong to another part of our inquiry. In forming a classification of the desires, we must be guided simply by the nature of the various objects which are desired. Those which may be specified as the most prevalent, and the most clearly to be distinguished as separate, may be referred to the following heads.

Among the desires, we have noticed the desire for knowledge, for moral improvement, for superiority, for esteem and approbation, for wealth, for information, and for society. All of these desires can be carried too far; as, for instance, a desire for wealth increases until a man loves gold and forgets his duties; then he is called a miser. It is right to make money, if the process does not interfere with any higher duty; but the desire of wealth, like any other desire, is hurtful when it is allowed to exercise an undue influence over the character. Desire may act differently upon different persons. For instance, one man will gratify a desire as soon as it makes appearance, regardless of conse-

quences; a second will hesitate, consider the circumstances, and sometimes act one way, and sometimes another; but a third person has such fixed moral principles in his character, that he will determine at once not to gratify an improper desire by any means. Thus we have three persons acting differently under the same desire. The man who can do what is right, against the force of an ardent desire, is a man of principle, and we can depend upon the rectitude of his conduct, even in cases where other men would falter or go astray.

Desire of the Animal Propensities.—The animal propensities are among the desires, and they lead to the gratification of the appetites; we see this illustrated in the case of the glutton and the drunkard. When the desire of the animal propensities is allowed to usurp undue influence, we have the lowest and most degraded character that can be conceived in the social world. The gratification of the animal propensities is commonly called the appetites.

Appetites are implanted in us for important purposes. When the animal propensities are allowed to break through all restraints, the consequences to society are of the most hurtful nature. What accumulated guilt, degradation, and wretchedness follow the course of the libertine! Thus is constituted a class of evils, of which no human law can take any adequate cognizance, and which therefore raise our views, in a special and peculiar manner, to a Supreme Moral Governor.

Unrestrained animal propensities injure both the individual and society.

Man is more than a mere animal, for he possesses reason. The animal is guided by impulse, but man is controlled by law. He who knows how to subdue his passions has learned an important lesson in morality. Such a man has risen to a higher level in the scale of humanity. He has conquered himself, and this is one of the greatest victories that he can achieve. His passions no longer master him, but he has overcome them, and uses them as his servants. A victory like this is worthy of a man's best endeavors.

The Desire of Wealth is possessed by almost every one, and when it is properly used, it is an excellent thing; in the hands of a benevolent person it is of great use and importance, but when it is carried too far, it degenerates into a sin. A miser has any amount of money, yet he does no good with it; he sees persons around him suffering for want of food, and still he does not relieve them; he thinks of little but his money; he neglects his duty to God, puts his whole power at work collecting money, and dies carrying nothing with him but sin, and leaving his money behind him. Other persons have wealth, live in luxury and ease; they relieve all around them, thus making money of great use and pleasure to themselves and to suffering humanity. Money is a good thing to possess, except when it takes our thoughts from every thing higher, and then we are led to neglect our duties to God and to man-

kind. Some persons stoop to sin, in order to obtain wealth; they will steal, and even commit murder to procure money.

The Desire of Power.—Ambition, or the desire of power, is the love of ruling, or of giving law to a circle of men, whether more or less extensive. When it becomes the governing propensity, the strongest principles of human nature give way before it, even those of personal comfort and safety. Thus we read of conquerors, who brave every danger to attain power; also of the statesman, who sacrifices health and peace. Then, there is the desire of exercising power over the minds of men; of persuading a multitude, by arguments or eloquence, to deeds of usefulness; of pleading the cause of the oppressed; a power of influencing the opinions of others, and of guiding them into sound sentiments and virtuous conduct. This is a species of power, the most gratifying by far to an exalted and virtuous mind, and one calculated to carry benefits to others wherever it is exerted.

The Desire of Superiority, or Emulation.—This is allied to the desire of power, except that it does not include any desire to rule, but it aims simply at the acquirement of pre-eminence. It is apt to lead to undue means for the accomplishment of its object; and every real or imagined failure tends to excite envy. Hence, it requires the most careful regulation, and when much encouraged in the young, it is not free

from the danger of sinking into malignant passions. Emulation may be seen in the case of gentlemen who strive to excel in dress and the luxury of the table, so that they may surpass their associates in these particulars. The same principle, directed to more worthy objects, may influence him who seeks to be distinguished in some high pursuit, intended to confer a lasting benefit upon his country.

Illustration.—The desire of power is seen in a soldier, when he sacrifices his life, health, and every thing to win a name; so ambitious, so anxious is he to be distinguished. Still, this desire, if not allowed to pass its bounds, does good. Many men strive for posthumous fame, in order to leave a great name in the world after they are dead. But when self-love or vanity is too great, the ambitious man neglects his real duty for some less worthy object.

Emulation.—The desire of superiority, or emulation, has an extended influence, when once allowed to gain power over man; and it is not easily confined within the limits of principle. It will lead a man on until he will hesitate at nothing to accomplish his object; and when he fails in this, he is almost sure to become envious, or his hatred will be aroused. Therefore this desire should be carefully guarded. It is well that we should possess some ambition. But this should not be too much encouraged in the young; for, after a while, it may result in evil passions.

The influence is measured according to the objects toward which the desire is directed. We see examples of it around us almost every day. A lady seeks to surpass her associates in the richness and elegance of her apparel, the profusion of her table, or the attractiveness of her house. Again it is seen in a man whose desire is to perform the most daring deeds, or to be the most fearless rider, and in a thousand other instances.

But this same principle, when directed toward higher objects, may be useful and beneficial to him who possesses it as well as to his associates. There is some reason to think, however, that the custom of giving prizes to children in school is attended with as much harm as good. Emulation is thus excited to such a pitch that the result is often anything but pleasing. Bad feelings are thus aroused among pupils, and the teacher learns too late that it would have been better if he had not excited so much emulation.

The Desire of Society.—Necessary as this desire is for the exercise of all of the affections, it is found in the union of men in communities, and in social intercourse, in the ties of friendship, and in the union of the domestic circle. If a person is not permitted to associate with his fellow-men, he is almost certain to show a strong attachment for animals; as if he could not live without some object on which to exercise the feelings which are given to every one, as a bond of union.

The Desire of Esteem, or Approbation.—Here is the love of having a good name, and of being esteemed by everybody. One man has a desire, but he will not gratify it, for fear that a certain person, or perhaps the community, will not approve of his course, and that, if he gratifies his desire, he will be less highly regarded. Some people there are, who will do almost anything to gain the approbation of men. They are not always guided by their own conscience, or sense of what is right, but they do exactly so as to please other people, and to be praised by them. It is a good thing to be praised by those who are themselves praised, and the esteem of good people is worth striving for; and while we are seeking for the praise of men, it is proper to make this distinction. When we praise others, it should be done in moderation, if it is to be worth anything. The more our characters are improved, the more value will belong to the praise which we bestow. Remember that, in giving and receiving approbation.

The Desire of Knowledge.—When an object possesses qualities which we think render it worthy of our possession, we feel a desire for it. So our conduct is often regulated by the desires and affections. Of the desires there may be many mentioned in moral philosophy, and these may, or may not, exert a good influence, according to the manner in which they are governed. All of the desires are of a kind of selfish nature. The desire of knowledge includes the principle of curiosity, which is only another name for the

spirit of inquiry. The tendency of this high principle must depend, as in the former cases, on its regulation, and the objects to which it is directed. The desire of knowledge may be considered among the more elevated desires; but this, too, when it is the predominating power, may become selfish. But when this desire keeps a fair means of obtaining its ends, and when obtained, is not selfishly used, it may be considered as one of the most influential powers. It is interesting to watch the desire of knowledge manifesting itself in children. The objects of this desire may vary from the idle tattle of the day to the highest attainments in literature.

Kinds of Knowledge.—There are two kinds of knowledge; as, intuitive and acquired. The intuitive principles, or first truths, are those which we know from the first; they were made with the soul, and are the foundation of ethics, or moral philosophy. Acquired knowledge is gained by experience. We know that we exist, and this is intuitive knowledge. On the other hand, we can easily tell, for instance, what harm gambling does, by looking at the many men who have gone to ruin from year to year by indulging in such practices. This, however, is acquired information.

The Desire of Moral Improvement is less likely to distort our feelings than any of the desires; but even this may be carried to such an extent that the person who thus exercises this desire sacrifices not

only his own pleasure with that of others, but he may also unconsciously injure men in order to do this; so intent is he upon one object, that he neglects other important ones. Still the desire of moral improvement leads to the highest state of man, and it bears this peculiar character, that it is adapted to men in every scale of society, and tends to diffuse a beneficial influence around the circle with which the individual is connected.

The Desire of Action.—A principle this is which ought to be mentioned as a leading peculiarity of human nature, though it may be difficult to determine the class to which it belongs. A person who is accustomed to work becomes weary, and then he desires rest; but when he has accomplished his desire, and has nothing to do, he finds himself dissatisfied and wretched. Trifling engagements of the unoccupied are referable to the same principle; they arise simply from a desire of mental excitement, the bliss of having something to do, rather than from any interest which occupations of that kind really possess.

Rest with its true pleasure is known best by those who must work regularly at their employments. Continued rest soon becomes tiresome, and on this account we may assert that the greatest degree of real happiness and enjoyment belongs to the middle classes of people, who have, besides the pleasures of life, an important and useful occupation, and not to the men of idleness, or to the unemployed votaries of fashion.

There is scarcely anything of more importance, in the external circumstances of individuals, than the promotion of their happiness, which is due to an interesting occupation.

Regulation of the Desires.—We should keep our desires under control, and be careful not to have too many unnecessary wants; for, if we can not get them supplied, it will make us unhappy. We should not waste our time upon useless desires, as it will make us cold and selfish. A desire for wealth is allowable, but we must not suffer it to interfere with our duties; if we are avaricious, it makes us love the bright glimmer of gold so much that we forget our duty to God, and to our fellow-men.

CHAPTER V.

THE AFFECTIONS—JUSTICE, INTEGRITY—FREEDOM OF ACTION—JUSTICE TO REPUTATION—DUTY TO OUR NEIGHBOR—CONDUCT AND CHARACTER—CANDOR—JUSTICE TO THE FEELINGS—THE GOLDEN RULE—MORAL CONDITION.

The Affections.—As the desires are intended to bring some gratification to ourselves, the affections lead us to our relations to men, and to a certain line of conduct which proceeds from these relations. Thus avarice, or ambition, or the desire of knowledge, and all of the other desires, have for their object the procuring of some gratification for ourselves; it is the pleasure of the possession of the money, or the power, or the knowledge, upon which the mind rests. But the feeling of justice, benevolence, parental affection, and the others here brought to view, are of a different nature. They are not desires seeking gratifications for ourselves, but feelings of duty to be performed towards others. An affection is a feeling of justice and benevolence. Emulation is a desire; it seeks a gratification for itself. Patriotism and regard for truth belong to the affections. They arise out of our relations to others, and urge us to certain duties towards them. Our affections gain strength, the longer they are exercised. The

mother loves her infant; but the older it grows, the more her love for the child increases. An affection tends to guard us against certain conduct of men. We say that we have an affection and love for living persons, and a desire for inanimate objects. The affections are to be viewed as original principles of our nature, planted within us for wise purposes. Their action is distinct from that of conscience and of reason.

Justice to the Interests of Others is Integrity. —Justice is at all times due to the person and property of others. This constitutes honesty or integrity. The great rule for guidance in this branch of science is found in the principles of moral rectitude. The test is, that our conduct to others should be the same as that which we should like to receive from them, were our interests concerned. In other words, we must obey the golden rule, and act towards others as we would have them act towards us. This secures peace and happiness.

Justice to the Freedom of Action of Others. —Some writers class justice with the affections; and it seems to be more nearly allied to them than to any of the moral emotions. Justice is a primary and essential part of our moral constitution; and hence, in youth, we should be taught to act justly towards every one, and continue it all through life. Justice embraces certain facts, in which every person has an absolute right; and here no man has a right to interfere with him. These rights have been divided into three classes;

namely, First, what I possess, no man has a right to take from me. Second, what I have a right to do, no man must prevent it. And, third, what I expect from other persons, it is their duty to perform.

Justice is due to the person, property, and interest of all men. To be just constitutes honesty and integrity. Of course, it implies abstaining from every dishonest or injurious violation of men's rights. Justice admonishes us not to interfere with the freedom of action claimed by persons. This constitutes personal liberty, which is of priceless value to its possessor.

Justice to the Reputation of Others.—In representing every thing in its true light, this consists. We should correct a false report that is being circulated, whether it concerns our friends or enemies, and use every effort to prevent its further circulation. A person may become involved in great difficulty, by attempting to show justice to one who has been placed in a false position; for by showing justice to one person, he may involve another in trouble. Great care should be exercised in collecting the truths together, so that every thing may be represented as it is, and then, if one is compelled to make his decision, let it be in favor of the person who has been misrepresented. By all means, let the decision be just. If all persons would only be careful as to what they say of others, there would be a great harmony in the world; and we should always remember that other persons may value their reputation as much as we do ours. When we are

compelled to tell any thing which we do not like to repeat, we should weigh every word, and think what impression it will convey, before we utter it, and then there is little danger in being embarrassed, if we are cross-questioned. Nor shall we be sorry for the words that we have spoken.

Without a doubt, justice is due to the reputation of others. We should do nothing that would injure the good name of any man. The best of us may have a dislike for a person, although he has never done any thing that would injure us, and we may hear things said about him that would damage his reputation; but it is our duty, in such a case, to correct the report, if we know that it is false.

Duty to our Neighbor.—Our duty towards our neighbor admonishes us not to do him any injustice, nor must we wrong him in any way. We must not make unpleasant remarks about him, thus injuring him in the opinion of men. This is negative; but we have a positive duty towards our neighbor, which bids us to love him, and to aid him whenever it is in our power to give him assistance. This reflection, when carried to its full extent, admitting the fatherhood of God, recognizes the universal brotherhood of men.

Justice in Estimating the Conduct and Character of Others.—To succeed in this, requires that we should carefully consider the motives that caused a person to act in a certain manner. We should

not hastily judge of the character of a person from one action ; for this act may be contrary to his usual conduct. When an action is referable to several motives, we must always attribute it to the most favorable one. It may happen that one has performed a deed against us; in trying to assign the action to the most favorable motive, there will be a violent conflict with self-love. We should then put ourselves in his place, and see if we should not have acted in the very same manner, under like circumstances. We shall generally find that we were at first too severe in our judgment. It is easier and better to forgive than to resent an injury, while it tends to cultivate the amiable qualities of goodness, mercy, and gentleness of disposition ; seeds which are sown on earth, but destined to flourish in Paradise.

Candor; or, Justice to the Opinions of Others.—We should be just in all of our undertakings, whatever may be the consequences. When a person expresses an opinion, we should not be influenced by dislike, so as not to be just in regard to its correctness, neither should we be blinded by affection, to think that the opinions of a person are right. It is our duty not to regard our love or dislike, in deciding whether a man is right or wrong, but we must be just. Candor is a quality which few possess in the highest degree. People are too much afraid of not being esteemed, and this restrains them from expressing their opinions freely. However, if a person entertains

an erroneous notion, we should correct it; and in the same manner we should be just in our estimation of individuals, all along striving to guard ourselves against the bad influences of prejudice. We may not expect to acquire moral perfection all at once, but we are to improve little by little.

Justice to the Feelings of Others.—Justice is due to the feelings of others, and this applies in many instances which do not affect either their character or their reputation. We may be unconscious of it, but at the same time wound men's feelings by our behavior before them. There are some persons who are exceedingly sensitive; towards these one strives to make himself as agreeable as possible, when he is in their presence. We may find persons who would not injure any one's feelings intentionally, but would still neglect paying the proper attention to things of this kind. And some men even bestow real benefits in such a manner as to wound the feeling of him upon whom the kindness is bestowed.

But the higher orders or degrees of misconduct, without any intended injury, may inflict permanent pain. Justice is opposed to flattery on the one hand, and on the other, to any unnecessary depreciation of character. The interests of others should not be injured. There is also a still higher class of injuries which the conscientious man will avoid; namely, injuries done to the moral principle. Towards minds of an extreme delicacy, a person of correct feeling strives

to conduct himself with suitable tenderness. We may find, however, persons of honest and upright minds, who would shrink from the least approach to real injury, but yet neglect the necessary attention to the feelings. The lower degrees of this principle belong to what is called mere good training, which has been defined as benevolence in trifles; but the higher degrees may restrain from conduct which, without any real injury, inflicts permanent distress.

The Golden Rule.—A great principle of justice is embraced in the golden rule. We should not be regardless of each other's feelings. Some of our friends, perhaps, are sensitive, and what we could say to one with impunity would wound the feelings of others. If we put ourselves in their places, we see precisely how we should wish them to treat us, and there will be no reason to complain; for surely we do not wish our friends to treat us indifferently, or slight us in the least; and if they act well towards us, we ought to do the same for them.

Justice to the Moral Condition of Others.—To the moral feelings of others, justice is due; and this may be applied to many circumstances. Without injuring people in their interest or their reputation, or even in our own opinion, we may behave to them in such a manner as to give them offence. However, we may find persons of honest and well-disposed minds, who neglect the necessary attention to the feelings.

To this head we may, perhaps, refer a due regard to the estimate which we lead a man to form of himself. This is opposed to flattery on the one hand, and on the other, to any unnecessary depreciation of his character. Flattery, indeed, is to be considered as a violation of that part of the truth which is known as veracity. A good definition of veracity is, that it consists in telling the truth. Injuries done to the moral principles of men, form a class of offences of which no human law takes any adequate cognizance; but we know that such injuries are wicked in their character and in their consequences.

CHAPTER VI.

Compassion and Benevolence — Benevolence to Distresses—To Reputation—To Character and Conduct—To Feelings—Caution—Improving Moral Condition—Definition.

The Cultivation of the Feelings of Compassion and Benevolence is calculated to promote two objects: the alleviation of distress in others, and the promotion in ourselves of a mental condition adapted to a state of moral discipline. Benevolence is wishing well to everybody, and beneficence is doing well to mankind. But if we really and truly wish well to our fellow-mortals, good conduct towards them is almost sure to be the result. Our benevolence is more certain of success, if its object is to relieve human suffering rather than to promote happiness directly. By bringing us continually in contact with the suffering and want of others, compassion and benevolence have a tendency to withdraw us from the power of self-love; they enable us to benefit others, but they also benefit ourselves. Compassion and benevolent exertion are due towards alleviating the distresses of others, towards their reputation, towards their character and conduct, and towards their feelings; they are also exercised

towards overcoming the moral degradation of others, including their ignorance and vice. The philanthropist is a lover of men, and in his conduct, benevolence and compassion are exemplified. He seeks for the suffering, and uses his best efforts to bring them certain and speedy assistance. Compassion and benevolence can be cultivated and improved in our own characters, so that, instead of giving us trouble, they will become easy by repetition, blessing us with a high degree of moral satisfaction and enjoyment.

Benevolence towards the Distresses of Others. — Kindness, benevolence, and gentleness should mark our conduct towards every one, for by this way we increase the fund of human happiness and gain many friends. Benevolence is to be exercised towards others; this consists not only in avoiding all injustice to their characters, but in protecting them against injuries, to check the course of slander, and to subdue the bad effects of those things which would make angry feelings among friends. Politeness, benevolence, morality, and religion teach us to cultivate good-will towards men. Benevolence seeks to extend the light of divine truth to nations that sit in moral darkness, and looks anxiously for the period of time when the knowledge of Christianity shall dispel every false faith, and put an end to the horrors of superstition.

We should keep in mind that we must sometimes deprive ourselves of comforts for the benefit of others.

Giving aid by money, with those who have the means, is one of the easiest forms in which benevolence can be granted. By personal exertion and by individual kindness, the same affection may be exercised in a degree much higher in itself, and often this personal aid is more useful than money to the afflicted. Full details of this subject would lead us into a field of inquiry which is too extensive for our present purpose.

Benevolence towards the Reputation of Others.—Towards the reputation of others benevolence is to be exercised. This consists, not only in avoiding any injury to their characters, but in exertions to protect them from hurtful things, to correct misrepresentations, to check the course of slander, and to obviate the attempts of those who would poison the confidence of friends, or disturb the harmony of society.

Benevolence is a disposition to do good to every one. If we are always kind to men, and do or say nothing that we think will be unpleasant to them, we shall act benevolently. If we can not say anything that will raise their reputation, we need not say anything at all. We should avoid those who slander or otherwise disturb the peace of society. A short slander reaches farther than a long apology does.

One of the affections, as it is, benevolence is of a most exalted character. When brought to bear upon the reputation, it tries to preserve a man's good name, but

not by any false intimation, or anything of that kind. A benevolent man will regret to know that any human being has suffered an injury in his reputation. It is the part of benevolence to protect mankind against all such misfortunes. It corrects erroneous statements, and guards human character as a jewel which is far more precious than diamonds and rubies. If you hear that a worthy character has a lauded reputation, by no means injure it; on the contrary, if you know of a single good quality belonging to him, let him have the benefit of it, but do not assist about making a report, unless you have the necessary information. It is a good thing to wish well to everybody, so that both our words and actions may be characterized by genuine and true benevolence.

Benevolence towards the Character and Conduct.—Including forgiveness of injuries, this consists in guarding ourselves against injuring the character of others. Character is what a man really is, while reputation is only what the world says about him. We must not damage a person's character by speaking, or by insinuation, particularly if he has in any way offended us. Even if we hear any one abusing his character, we are not to stand and listen to it in silence. If this person happens to be a very dear friend, of course the hearer will not listen to anything that might hurt his character. If it does require courage, then, speak even in behalf of an enemy; and though this course may not be praised by our friends, it is

more in the sight of God than simply taking the part of a friend.

Forgiveness of injuries is appropriately placed here; for if we are careful to avoid injuring another's character, we shall soon be prepared to forgive the injuries that he may have inflicted.

Benevolence towards the Feelings of Others.—Good-will towards the feelings of men is benevolence; it includes those kindly affections which produce such a powerful influence in all the relations of life, but which it is hard for us to delineate. Benevolence seems particularly to belong to our association with inferiors and dependents. It may often relate to trifles, but it includes many circumstances in which we may surrender our own feelings to those of others. Many persons, who are benevolent in numerous respects, are apt to forget that a highly important feature of benevolence consists in the cultivation of gentleness, courtesy, and kindness.

An important feature of veracity is correctness in ascertaining facts. This is essential to the love of truth. In the reception of truth, especially on the evidence of testimony, we acquire by degrees an experience of caution, arising from having been deceived sometimes. The want of necessary caution leads to credulity; but it is the part of a well-regulated mind to avoid this extreme. In other minds, this may produce a kind of uncertainty with regard to all evidence; that is, it may produce scepticism, which is the other extreme, and should also be avoided.

Caution.—We should be very careful not to wound the feelings of any person. Remember that, to some people, we can say a great deal, and they will not object to it, while, if we were to say half as much to others, they will be deeply wounded. We should not only be particular in this respect, but we should discourage others from saying objectionable things; and when such remarks have been made, it is our duty to prevent their bad effects, so far as it may be in our power to make the reparation.

Benevolence towards Improving the Moral Condition of Others.—There are different ways of improving the condition of a man. We may do this in a kind, friendly way; if we are wealthy, our gifts should be tendered in a gentle way, with loving generosity. Some givers are benevolent just for approbation; they wish the public to know of their gifts; they bestow them in such a condescending manner that the receiver is made to feel badly; while others have good intentions, but do not know how to act in a becoming spirit.

Definition.—Affections are feelings towards a person or persons; as, love, friendship, gratitude, and the domestic affections. In morals it is advisable that we should know what a duty is itself, and not content ourselves by explaining a term by a mere word or set of words. The best way to understand the true meaning of benevolence and compassion is to study them in the

conduct of our associates, and to practise them ourselves as important means of improving our moral characters.

Unquestionably there are different kinds of affections; as, the parental, the filial, the conjugal, the human affections, the kind regard which we entertain for our fellow-men, together with our love for God. Benevolence is to be exercised in regard to the moral degradation of fallen humanity, including men's ignorance and vice. This prevents us from deriving satisfaction from moral evil, even though it should contribute to our advantage. It aims at raising man's moral condition.

CHAPTER VII.

VERACITY—LOVE OF TRUTH—ASCERTAINING FACTS—DELIVERING STATEMENTS—OBSERVATIONS—TRUTH OF PURPOSE.

ALTHOUGH we have spoken about veracity, we return to it now for the purpose of examining it more particularly. Its place in moral philosophy is too important for it to be neglected, and we should spare no pains to make it a practical feature in our moral character.

All men have a natural tendency to speak the truth, unless this principle is overcome by some strong, selfish motive. We are inclined to depend upon the veracity of others, until, by experience, we grow cautious. This is the reason why children and inexperienced persons are credulous and easily imposed upon by unfounded statements. Upon this confidence in the truthfulness of mankind, is founded a large portion of the knowledge on which we rely; such as that which we receive through the historian, the traveller, and the naturalist. Credulity believes too much, while scepticism believes too little; and these are the two extremes, which we must learn to avoid with all of the patient attention which we are able to command.

Some of the principal elements which are essential to veracity are: first, correctness in obtaining facts; second, accuracy in relating them; and third, fidelity in keeping promises. The correctness in learning facts is necessary to the love of truth. It requires us to be very careful respecting all statements which we accept as true, and not to accept anything as the truth, until we are sure that the authority is good, and that the statement contains all the facts to which our attention ought to be directed.

Closely connected with the love of truth in receiving, is the exercise of veracity in the statement of facts, whether derived from our own observation, or accepted by testimony from others. We should be careful in relating anything, and should state it just as it is, in such a manner as to make a correct impression upon the hearer. To veracity, under this head, we also refer the rule of giving to others an honest and fair impression of our views, motives, and intentions. This is sincerity.

We now come to the third element of veracity, which is truth of purpose, or fidelity in keeping promises. This is opposed to any actual departure from what was really promised, or to avoiding the performance of a stated or implied engagement, on any other ground than inability to perform it. By this integrity of purpose, an individual gives a clear impression of what he honestly intends to perform, and does it, no matter what may have happened to make fulfilment disagreeable or injurious to himself. Still, the person to

whom one makes a promise, may release him from its performance.

The Love of Truth in the Reception of it.—We are to exercise much care respecting every statement which we receive as true, and are not to receive an assertion until we are thoroughly satisfied that the authority is of a nature upon which we can fully rely. The sound exercise of judgment, which is connected with this love of truth, differs, therefore, from the art of ingenious disputation, and is often found directly at variance with it. The love of truth, however, is of equal importance in the reception of facts, and in the formation of opinions.

The practice of this sincere and candid search after truth, on every subject to which the mind may be directed, ought to be cultivated in early life with great care. It is a habit of the mind, which must exercise a most important influence in the formation of both moral and intellectual character. In the reception of truth, especially on the evidence of testimony, we acquire by experience a degree of caution. Some minds lack this, while others have too much caution.

Ascertaining Facts.—One important element of veracity is correctness in ascertaining facts. This is essential to the love of truth. It requires us to exercise discretion in regard to every statement which we receive as true, and not to accept it as such, until we are assured that it is worthy of belief, and that the state-

ment contains all of the facts to which our attention ought to be directed. In science we may suppose that the wonderful statements have been advanced without attention to this direction; and yet, if we examine the matter, we shall find that many of the admissions, which appear so strange to us, were not received until they were proved by scientists in different ages, and in countries which are remote from each other. This procedure guards us against those limited views, by which party spirit, or a love of favorite dogmas, leads a man to receive the facts which favor a particular opinion, and neglect those which are opposed to it. The practice of a sincere and candid search after truth, on every subject to which the mind may be directed, ought to be cultivated in early life, with the most assiduous attention.

Veracity in Delivering Statements.—Associated with the love of truth in receiving facts, is the exercise of veracity in the statement of them, whether derived from our personal observation, or received by testimony from others. This includes sincerity. It consists not only in the most scrupulous accuracy of relation, but in giving it in such a manner as to convey a correct impression to the hearer. Veracity is opposed to that method which tries merely to assume the appearance of truth.

Facts may be associated together in such a manner as to give the appearance of cause and effect, when they are in truth entirely unconnected; or an event may be

represented as usual, which has occurred only in one or two instances. The common saying, that there are two ways of telling a story, does not directly refer to what is called fabrication, or falsehood, but to those distortions of circumstances which, however slight, have the effect of changing the impression made by the whole statement. Sincerity is opposed to flattery, which tends to give a man a false impression of our opinion and feeling toward him, and leads him to a false estimate of his own character.

Another element of veracity is truth of purpose, or fidelity in the fulfilment of promises. This is opposed to a departure from what was promised; likewise, to exciting a hope, or conveying an impression which one does not mean to fulfil. When a man promises a thing, he ought to keep his promise, though he may find it disagreeable or injurious to himself. "He sweareth to his own hurt," says a sacred writer, "and changeth not."

Fallacy does not always consist in stating the facts erroneously. Sometimes the facts, though truly given, leave a false impression. We should guard against this; because it is equivalent to a direct false statement in its effect. And we should not infer that because a certain thing happened once or twice it must always be so. We should state facts as they are: one change may cause a wrong impression. Closely allied to this is sincerity. It is directly opposed to hypocrisy; for it does not feel one thing and say another. Its sentiments are always stated just as they come from the heart.

Observations.—When we have told the truth about anything, we experience satisfaction and enjoyment, although we may be punished for it, instead of gaining a reward from our fellow-men; for they look on the outward part, but God looks upon the heart, the soul, while he sees what our motives are, and what prompts us to action. Therefore, let us always speak the truth; it is mighty, and shall prevail. Veracity is truthfulness, and leads to fidelity in the fulfilment of a promise. It is the duty of every one to tell the truth, as far as it is in his power to do so. When we have been deceived by a person, we are disposed never to believe a statement of his without the testimony of some one else, in whose veracity we confide. Sometimes we may promise a thing which it is unpleasant to fulfil, but duty admonishes us to keep our promises.

Truth of Purpose.—Faithfulness, or truth of purpose, in the fulfilment of promises, is an element of veracity; it is opposed to all those deceits by which one may convey a false impression. By a straightforward, honest, and upright purpose, one gives a clear impression of what he really intends to perform. Every person should be careful about making promises; and no one should make a promise, unless he knows that he is able to fulfil it. Then, if he promises and fails to do as he said he would, he must have a good reason for such conduct. Promises are easily made, and they are as easily broken, but they are not so easily forgotten by those persons who have thus been disappointed.

CHAPTER VIII.

Friendship and Kindred Affections—Friendship, Love, and Gratitude—Love of Country—Domestic Affections—The Defensive Affections—Exercise of the Affections—Observations—Moral Approbation—Happiness—Downward Progress—Temper—Self-Love—Sense in which Self-Love is Used—Self-Love Compared with Selfishness—Remarks—Tendency of Self-Love—Selfishness—Disinterested Conduct—Observations.

Friendship and Kindred Affections.—Friendship, love, and gratitude, as affections, are nearly connected. They consist in a personal attachment to an individual, or to individuals. We exercise these affections in a manner to promote the interest and comfort of the object of our regard; to preserve and advance his reputation; his feelings we treat with great tenderness. We endeavor to improve his intellectual and moral condition. Improvement of moral condition is the highest office of friendship.

Gratitude is a feeling of thankfulness towards a benefactor for some deed of his kindness. Gratitude, the affections, and self-love are all closely and intimately related to each other; they show themselves in a peculiar love for a person or for persons.

Love of Country.—Patriotism is the love of country; it can not be considered as a distinct affection, but as a result of other affections. It requires that we should respect the institutions of our country, willingly submit to the laws, and defend our land in all attacks made upon its liberty. Patriotism also requires that we cultivate this love of country in others, and try to improve the moral as well as the mental condition of our fellow-citizens. This last is the highest office of patriotism.

The love of one's country is a very laudable affection. It is a wish to promote the interest of the government in every possible way, influenced by no other motive than a pure love of country.

Care should be taken that the affections, particularly the defensive affections of anger, jealousy, and resentment, do not exert an undue influence upon our conduct. They are good enough in their places, but the trouble is, that when they are aroused we are not able to restore them to perfect tranquillity.

The Domestic Affections.—In this class are included the conjugal affections, parental feeling, with the ties of brothers and sisters. These affections and feelings call forth a high degree of exertion, to perform the duties required by them. In the conjugal relation, the affections lead persons to the tenderness, the confidence, the united sympathy of those who have one hope, one course of duty, and one interest. The parental affections require the highest possible degree of

that feeling which studies the advantage and the welfare of the object of a parent's care. The father studies the advancement of his child's happiness, the improvement of his mind, together with the formation of his character and habits, both as a rational and as a moral being.

It is very beautiful to observe how these domestic affections arise out of each other, and how the right exercise of them tends to their mutual development. The father should consider his son as his special care; he should watch over the strengthening of his character, and the cultivation of his moral feelings. He should see that his son has suitable company; and, as far as possible, has good influences over him, by never doing anything in his presence which it would injure the the child to imitate.

The Defensive Affections are the feelings of jealousy, anger, and resentment; these are, not less than the other affections, to be considered as a part of our moral nature. They are calculated to perform a very important duty, provided they are kept under the control of reason and of the moral principle, or conscience.

By the exercise of our feelings of justice and benevolence, we sympathize with the injured and oppressed, and try to defeat the schemes of their enemies. But a still higher object can be accomplished by these feelings; that is, to seek the offender, and try to convert enemies into friends. These feelings are often improperly used, and that is the case when they are allowed

to be roused by trivial causes. When our feelings are excited to a higher pitch than the injury calls for, or when we harbor our revenge long after we should have forgotten and forgiven the affront, and when resentments lead in any measure to retaliation or undue revenge, they are wrong. Yet the sound exercise of the defensive affections is frequently necessary. Their proper object is primarily a sense of blamable conduct in others, and they lead us to use proper measures for protecting ourselves.

Defensive affections can do both good and evil. We may do wrong, and cause the anger of our parents or friends; and to think of losing friends, perchance by our own carelessness, may bring us to a heartfelt repentance. What a happy man must he be, who puts the best construction upon everything! who does not take offence at trifles; does not study, as some do, irritating speeches to rouse the anger of a person who has done him no harm! Those who are the most ready to take offence, are the persons who are not always prepared to forgive.

Important Influence Produced upon the Exercise of the Affections.—The influence produced upon the affections by attention and by habit is very strong, or important, and it consists in directing the mind intensely to all the considerations which ought to guide us, in the case to which the affection refers. It leads us to imagine ourselves in other peoples' places, and it teaches us to do unto them as we would have

them act in regard to us. We then not only enter into their feelings and try to relieve the distress of those with whom we are brought in contact, but we are inclined to seek out persons who are in trouble, and try to console them : this is called sympathy.

By steadily directing the attention to sympathy, we, in a great measure, overcome our selfishness. The influence produced upon the affections by habit is great. A distinguished philosopher says : "The tendency of all emotions is to become weaker by repetition, or to be less acutely felt, the oftener they are experienced." When the emotion of pity for human distress is aroused, it ought to accomplish its proper object, before it sinks into barren coldness and indifference to suffering.

Observations.—Parental love is very strong. We see it illustrated when a mother sits up night after night with her sick child, regardless of her own health. She does not act thus because she is afraid that she will be considered heartless, and be censured by her neighbors if she does not do so, nor because she thinks that it is her duty ; but because of her great love for the child. The filial affection is also remarkable. A loving child will do almost anything for his parents. Obedience is the first care with him, and it is his chief duty.

In order that moral causes may be uniform, persons should have sound minds and be civilized. We hardly expect a savage to experience the same effects from moral causes that a civilized person does. The barbarian knows little of the divine Governor of the universe,

and even this little is imperfect; he has not been taught to read the Scriptures. Neither do we expect to find an idiot expounding the Word of God; the idiot cannot understand it, as his mind is impaired, or entirely destroyed; he knows nothing of God, or the hereafter. We do hope to find persons with good minds and highly educated, influenced by moral causes. But there are many things which call the mind from God, and we find some of the highly-educated persons among skeptics; but there is something seriously wrong about the person, if he does not believe in the Supreme Being, and in a future state of rewards and punishments, or retribution.

Man is a fallen creature. God made him perfect at first;—perfect, he made man like himself;—but now, man is weak, erring, and sinful. A change has come over man, by which the harmony of his physical, mental, and moral powers is impaired. God gave to man perfect qualities, divine and pure; but now we see man plunged into every species of sin and misery. Man was made upright, but how has he fallen from his pure estate! Still a free agent, man can be good, but not perfect in his present state of discipline. God has given us many blessings, and he has placed among our faculties conscience, as a guiding principle; but few men always go according to the dictates of their consciences, hence we see moral degradation.

The Feeling of Moral Approbation.—Attached to the exercise of the affections, is this feeling of moral

approbation, it is a part of our moral constitution, intended to bind men together by certain offices of justice, friendship, compassion, and conscience, which last has been well termed "the voice of God within us." Moral approbation is an impression of merit, which is frequently attached to the exercise of our affections. When a man, without any regard for his own comfort, devotes himself to accomplishing a natural impulse, we may, or may not, give to his conduct the feeling of moral approbation. He acts merely from an inward movement, which he perceives to be a part of his constitution, and he, perhaps, does not think that he deserves any special praise for doing his duty. This principle applies to all of the affections in a certain degree.

Youth is the time when the affections are to be trained in the proper manner, so that children may learn, in early life, to act well their parts, and thus receive the moral approbation of God, their fellow-men, and their own consciences.

Happiness Arising from a Due Exercise of the Affections.—When we exercise the affections, we not only have the satisfaction of knowing that we have done our duty, but we feel that we have relieved others of their distress, and have thus made them happy. This is also obeying God, and the golden rule. If we entertain good affections, and use them properly, we shall feel contented and happy. True happiness is to be obtained, not so much by confining our attention

to our own welfare exclusively, but by relieving the sufferings and promoting the interests of those by whom we are surrounded. Remember, however, that it is harder to promote happiness directly, than it is to accomplish the same object by relieving distress.

Children should be shown instances of human want, and be allowed to help the afflicted. They should be told what one ought to do under such circumstances. When grown, a person thus taught will not forget the lesson, and whenever brought into contact with such cases of misery, he will not withstand the emotions which prompt him to lend a helping hand and a pitying heart.

Downward Progress.—The first time that a man does anything wrong, he is astonished at himself; but he seems to think that he can not improve, and he goes from bad to worse, until there is little hope for him, or for his reformation. After a while, it becomes as easy for him to do a wrong as a right action. But if he had resolved, after the first offence, not to do anything else that was wrong, he could have stopped his bad career, and he would have been pardoned.

The Influence of Temper.—When we view any subject for its truth, or real meaning, our whole mind must be in a placid condition. Imagine our feeling of sorrow, when we look upon a person who has none of the benevolent or uniting affections, but who is overruled by anger, jealousy, and resentment. On the con-

trary, what a constant source of pure enjoyment is a meek and quiet spirit! the desires of which are moderate and under due regulation, which puts upon everything the best construction of which it will admit, is slow to take offence, seeks no distinction, but views itself with humility, and others with candor, benevolence, and indulgence. Such a disposition makes the man happy in himself, and a source of happiness and peace to all around him. He loves others, and is himself loved in return. His is an amiable disposition.

Self-Love.—In one sense, self-love is important, if we do not let it run into selfishness. It is desirable that we should be good to ourselves, and steadily advance towards perfection.

The Sense in Which Self-Love Is Employed.—We use the term self-love to express the good and proper regard a person has for himself, which provides for his health, comfort, and improvement. Like the other mental feelings, self-love is to be considered as a part of our moral constitution, and intended to answer important purposes, provided it is kept in its proper place, and does not encroach upon the duties and affections which we owe to society.

A sound self-love ought to lead us to seek our own true happiness, and should prove a check upon those appetites and passions which interfere with this; for many of them, it must be allowed, may be not less adverse to our own real interest and comfort, than they

are to our duty to other men. We should not only avoid everything that is opposed to our own interest, but also that which will disturb our peace of mind. Self-love, viewed in this manner, appears to be placed as a regulating principle among the other powers, much inferior to the great principle of conscience, so far as regards the moral condition of the individual, but designed to answer important purposes in promoting the harmony of society.

We may consider among these purposes the pleasure belonging to the exercise of our affections themselves, a feature of our moral constitution. There is also a feeling of dissatisfaction and self-reproach, which follows any neglect of a due exercise of the affections, and which, in a well-regulated mind, disturbs the mental tranquillity fully as much as the disapprobation of other men does.

It is farther evident that a man of badly regulated affections destroys his own peace, damages his health, and often causes his premature death. There is not, perhaps, a state of more intense suffering than when the depraved heart, disappointed in those gratifications to which it is enslaved, and shut up from the excitement by which it seeks to escape from the horrors of reflection, is thrown back upon itself to be its own tormentor.

Self-Love Compared with Selfishness.—According to our use of the terms, self-love is right, but selfishness is wrong. We are to have enough love and

respect for our characters to protect them from injury, and not allow ourselves to be imposed upon by any one ; we should consult our own happiness to a certain extent, without being selfish. But whenever we go to the extreme, and do nothing unless it will materially assist our individual power, wealth, and advantage, it is no longer self-love, but selfishness. The motive gives moral quality to an action.

Remarks.—Self-love is one of the affections, and is possessed by everybody to some extent; all strive to promote their own pleasure and interest before that of any one else, unless they have by experience learned to modify such conduct. Some persons are so anxious for their own pleasure, and care so little about that of others, that they in many instances materially injure near and dear friends.

When self-love has long held complete control of a man, he grows selfish, and cares for nothing but himself. He will even sacrifice the lives of persons in distress, when it is in his power to aid them. Selfishness is one of the most detestable traits that a man can possess. A selfish person causes his friends to dislike him; and often, in a struggle to enhance his interest, he goes so far as to risk his own safety, while he is endangering that of others.

The Tendency of Self-Love.—A true and rational self-love leads us to the improvement of our minds; it makes us prudent about our words and ac-

tions, while we are striving to obtain health, wisdom, and goodness. It makes us thoughtful about what people say of us; because we are anxious for our fellow-beings to love us. Rational self-love is improving, while it is kept within the limits of moderation; but when given a free rein, it becomes a curse rather than a blessing; its proper tendency is thus misdirected. Under these circumstances, it leads us to resort to any means for the attainment of an object, regardless of the consequence, and the resulting selfishness is a cause of great misery.

The man who is so engrossed with self, encased, as it were, in armor against the distresses of the poor, and utterly oblivious to everything that does not affect his own interest or pleasure, is he in whom selfishness has been allowed to assert a controlling power. Generosity, on the other hand, is a beautiful trait of character, which is eminently worthy of due cultivation.

Selfishness.—When the principle of self-love becomes deranged or excessive in its exercise, it leads to those habits by which a man seeks his own gratification. If any of his business is connected with his neighbor, whenever it suits him to change it in any way, he thinks but little, except of his own convenience, and probably puts his neighbor to much trouble. This he may do by an undue pursuit of any of the desires; avarice, ambition, or even the love of knowledge itself may be so indulged as to assume the same character. But a man of this kind often seeks

the applause of the public, from whom he expects to derive some personal benefit or advantage. Hence we place much more value upon anything that we know to be done by a free good-will than upon what is done in a selfish manner. Generous conduct commands the approbation of all men, and it is striking to remark how, in the highest conception of such a character that fancy can delineate, we are met by the sublime morality of the sacred writings, impressed upon us by the purest motives.

Disinterested Conduct and Self-Denial.—As the principle of self-love is distorted in its aims and action, it leads to those habits by which a man strives after his own pleasure in a way which interferes with his personal and social obligations. The doctrine of self-denial was taught by the ancient Stoics, and it occupies a prominent place in Christianity, where we are taught to forgive those who injure us, to love our enemies, to bless those who curse us, and to pray for those who despitefully use us and persecute us; thus we are taught to deny ourselves.

Deeds of kindness may be misdirected and carried to excess, when they are merely performed for the applause of the world, or for the approbation of some particular person from whom one expects to receive a reward. But the noblest pattern of disinterested conduct and self-denial may be found in the sacred writings, and it is recorded there for our imitation. Unless we draw our hearts from selfish things, we can not

hear the music of angelic choirs, attuned to that great harp whose countless strings are swept by the hand divine. Then, let us cultivate generosity, kindness, and forbearance. This course of action is impressed upon us through the purest and the most exalted motives, the imitation of Him who is the giver of all good. We are instructed to imitate our divine Exemplar, so that we may be the children of our Father, who is in heaven; for he makes his sun to rise on the evil and on the good; and he bestows his refreshing showers upon the just as well as upon the unjust. His mercy is so great that it blesses the righteous and extends to the wicked. Love is the fulfilling of the law, and men are commanded to love one another.

Observations.—Taking a review of self-denial, we see that it is directly opposed to selfishness. It consists in abstaining from comforts and enjoyments, in order to promote our happiness and that of others. One may deny himself a great many things to gain the good-will of another, yet this is self-interest. But when a man practises self-denial in order to give pleasure to others, even when he knows that he will receive nothing for it in return, he deserves credit, while his conduct is worthy of sincere regard and imitation.

CHAPTER IX.

THE WILL—VOLITION—MORAL CAUSES—THEIR NATURE—UNIFORMITY OF MORAL RELATIONS—KNOWLEDGE—ATTENTION—MORAL HABITS—HABITS AND CHARACTER—CORRECTING INJURIOUS HABITS—CONCLUSIONS—DIVINE ASSISTANCE—ITS NECESSITY AND PROBABILITY—FAITH—ILLUSTRATION.

The Will is a great feature in human character. A moral man wills to do what is right, because it is right; a religious man does what is right, because it is the will of God.

Will is one of the principles which constitute man as a moral being, one who is responsible for his actions. It is that which determines man's conduct. When he wills an act, it will most certainly follow, if not restrained by some outside influence; or the deed will be prevented, if the man is incapable of performing it. These are the things which can prevent a man from following his will. A great many persons are proud of their wills, and take pleasure in them. Truly, it is an excellent thing to have a will of your own; but still more so, if you have judgment and discretion in exercising it; and while thus engaged, one should never be so narrow-minded as to forget the interests of others.

We must will a thing before we can succeed in accomplishing it; and though, at first, it may seem difficult to do, yet if our will is strong enough, we shall succeed in our undertaking. The objects which belong to the will, may be divided into two classes; namely, things to be obtained, and actions to be performed towards members of the human family. The will should be trained in childhood, so that, in after years, it may not be unrestrained, and prove a disadvantage to its owner.

Actions produced by the will arise out of the mental emotions formerly treated of,—the desires and the affections; the next mental act, according to the regular course of a reflecting mind, is proposing to ourselves the question, Shall we gratify the desire? or shall we exercise the affection? Then follows the process of considering or deliberating.

Simple Volition.—We have said that simple volition, or the act of willing, has its origin from the desires or affections. We see, perhaps, a variety of considerations or inducements, some of which are in favor of gratifying the desire or exercising the affection, while others are opposed to it. Without intellect there is no light, and without sensibility there is no motive. As distinguished from mere impulse, rational will involves rational choice; but without the intellect there can be no rationality, and without the sensibility there can be nothing to choose. With these we have all that we need, not as a cause, but as a condition for the will.

We desire an object, or we experience an affection; the next mental act, according to a well-regulated and reflective mind, is to inquire whether we shall gratify this desire or affection; then we must look at both sides of the question, seeing the way in which it will be of any advantage to us, and also its disadvantages, from which we can make our decision. This last act of the mind is what we call will, or simple volition. Then, if we will to do anything, the act will be done; and if we will not to perform it, the act will be left undone, unless the will is overcome.

The Operation of Moral Causes.—For the operation of moral causes upon the will, certain circumstances are required of the individual, upon whom they are expected to exert their power. It is necessary that we should have a knowledge of our moral condition; and that the truths may be presented to us in such a manner that we shall fully comprehend them, we must ourselves be in a perfect state of moral feeling. We can generally tell what effect a tale of distress will have upon any person, just from our knowledge of his moral feelings.

The Nature of Moral Causes.—In studying the nature of moral causes, we are led to notice the diversity of their operation in different individuals. When a person is deliberating whether he will perform an act, certain motives are brought into view, and they are known as moral causes. It is the nature of moral

causes to determine whether or not the deed shall be performed. Self-love is a moral cause; for if the act should require too much exertion, or self-denial, it would tend to keep us from doing the deed.

We feel under certain obligations to some persons, and if our conduct opposes their interest, it restrains us from our purpose. Another moral cause is judgment, which shows us the effect of a certain act. Still another moral cause is the feeling of duty, which compels us to go forward. We thus see people act from different motives. One acts in the way by which he will acquire influence, or gain advantage. Another person will sometimes act in one way, and sometimes in another way. Yet another will always do right, regardless of consequences.

We can always tell what the conduct of the first and third of these persons will be, but we can not foretell about the second. The causes of this diversity are referable to attention, to knowledge, and to moral habits. The first, attention, exercises a great influence. It requires that we should know the import of the facts, and see their relation to each other. Knowledge requires that we should grasp all of the truths, and not join two things together as cause and effect, unless they really have such a relation.

So much depends upon the moral habits of a person. If he has been doing right all the time, it will be comparatively easy for him to continue in the path of rectitude. But if he has not tried to do right, it will be difficult for him to do so without a special effort. Upon

a person whose moral habits are correct, moral causes will act. Moral causes resemble physical causes in requiring certain conditions for their operation.

Uniformity of Moral Relations.—We have every reason to believe that there are moral causes, which have a tendency to influence the volition and the conduct in the same manner that chemical agents affect each other. These moral causes do not act all the time, but we receive them with the same degree of certainty as we do testimony. The moral causes act in the same manner as two chemical substances; they must first be brought together, before they can act. Sometimes we depend upon this uniformity altogether, and in other cases, we only rely upon it to a certain extent.

Knowledge.—A primary and essential element, in the due regulation of the will, is a correct knowledge of truths and motives, which tend to influence its determination. The highest of these comprehends the truths of religious belief, a series of moral causes, the tendencies of which are of the most important kind, calculated to exert a uniform power over every man, who surrenders himself to their guidance.

For this purpose, a correct knowledge of these truths and motives is required, and all who have this knowledge within their reach, acquire a deep moral responsibility for their conduct. From nature and revelation we may derive a knowledge of the character of Deity.

Without knowledge, we should not expect moral causes to act. For instance, a man must know what his duty is, before he can reduce it to practice. Hence arises the importance of moral and religious instruction.

Attention.—A very important question, morally, is strict attention, so as to bring ethical ideas together in the proper way. If a man will honestly attend to his own affairs, in the course of time, he will be decidedly improved. When a particular subject is present to his mind, he has the power to decide whether or not he can be influenced by it, and also to determine whether or not that can guide him. If, by this, the inclination is condemned, a sound mind soon dismisses it, and the moral state is retained in a healthful condition.

This, however, may be neglected, and something else may occupy the mind; it may not be exercised in the correct way, or the man may become careless. And if the truth is not properly received, the mental action is destroyed, and so is purity of heart. The habits that are thus welcomed, soon acquire great control over a person's feelings. Inattention is indulged so much that it becomes a habit, and the unfortunate man is carried away by passion. Then good feelings are gradually weakened, and soon destroyed, in such a condition of the moral powers.

Moral Habits.—A condition in which a desire or an affection, repeatedly acted upon, is, after each repetition, acted upon with less effort, is a moral habit. In

the same way, when a truth or moral principle has been passed over, time and again, without any adequate attention, each time it makes less and less impression, until at length, it ceases to exert any influence over the moral feelings or actions.

That conduct which follows sympathy and benevolence, at first, requires some effort, but after each repetition, it becomes easier, until, at last, habits of active benevolence are formed. It is the same way with habits of vice.

The Influence of Habits upon Character.— Important is the truth about habit, that it deserves constant and deep attention; for character consists, in a great measure, of habits. These habits arise out of individual acts and repeated operations of the mind. Thus, we may hear of a man who swears that he will abandon intoxicants for a certain number of years, and probably the very same man will be found in a state of inebriation the next day. Or the habit may be suspended by the influence of an oath; but the desire remains unsubdued, and resumes its former power, whenever this artificial restraint is withdrawn. The effect is the same as if the man had been in confinement during the time, or had been kept from his indulgence by some other restraint, entirely of an external kind. The gratification was prevented, but his moral nature was unchanged.

Habit is at first like a spider's web, which may be brushed away; but, after long indulgence, it becomes

like a strong cable, binding its unhappy victim hand and foot, conquering the will, and making reformation almost impossible. On the other hand, benevolent conduct, at first, may require a certain effort, and is accompanied by a strong feeling of the emotion which leads to it. But after each repetition the acts go on with less feeling of the emotion, while there is progressively forming the habit of active benevolence.

Attention has much to do with the formation of character, and habit is next in order; for after we have practised any action for a while, it becomes so easy that it is called second nature, and we delight in it. What may at first seem difficult to perform, after constant attention and practice, becomes a habit. It is no difficult matter to fall into degenerating habits; but after we have engaged in elevating pursuits, they are quite easy; consequently, our good habits form good character.

It is precisely the same with habits of vice. At first a deed requires an effort and a powerful contest with moral principles; then it is speedily followed by that feeling of regret, to which superficial observers give the name of repentance. This is the voice of conscience; but its power is more and more diminished after each repetition of the deed. Even the judgment becomes perverted respecting the great principles of moral rectitude; and acts, which at first caused a violent conflict, are committed without remorse.

Means of Correcting Injurious Habits.—The best way of correcting injurious habits is, first, to

let conscience have entire control over the morals, and to act in accordance with its promptings. When we are just ready to perform a deed, let us ask ourselves, Is it right? or is it wrong? and conscience will give the correct answer. It depends, however, upon whether or not we have become so hardened by allowing the passions to rule over us, that the dictates of conscience may not have any influence over our behavior. Then we must harmonize the affections and desires. We shall think for a long while that it is impossible for us to become good, but in the end perseverance will conquer.

Conclusions.—There are some practical conclusions which arise from the principles of moral habits. By our moral habits we are brought into close relation to the Divine Being, and here we learn the lesson of obedience. If we are under this influence, we are more affectionate to humanity, and more ready to forgive an injury done us, than we should be otherwise. It is of great moment that we should have moral influences thrown around us, in order to develop moral character. Our associates should be known to possess moral character. We may not be able to make a fortune, or to occupy a place of high distinction, but we can be good, and it is within our power to improve our moral condition.

Divine Assistance.—Without divine aid we can not correct the moral derangement, when our soul or conscience tells of our error. God can correct it, and

if we ask him to do so, he will answer us by granting our request, for he has said, "Seek, and ye shall find; ask, and it shall be given unto you."

The Necessity and Probability of Divine Aid.—There is no improbability that the Holy One does hold communication with the soul, and impart an influence in the hour of its deepest need. In accordance with our highest conceptions, man is among the greatest of his works. We contemplate the moral principle as an emanation from the Deity. We know that God's eye reaches the inmost movements of our souls, and every thing is exposed to his view. He knows all things. When our affections are wandering away from him, he looks down upon them, and has compassion upon us as a father pities his son.

Upon every sound principle of philosophy, all things must be open to God's inspection. When the spirit tries to throw off its earthy bondage, and strives to conform its will to that of the Deity, then God affords his assistance. In all such instances, we can not believe it to be otherwise. It is impossible for us to believe that all things could go on without his aid. God is everywhere, looking upon us. He has the power and willingness to impart to us the aid which we require.

Faith.—Now we come to study the influence of that mental power which is called faith. There is a power in the mind itself which is calculated to draw down upon it an influence of the most efficient kind. This

is produced by the mental process called faith. Suppose that we have a friend who is very intelligent and virtuous, and who has a great influence over us; he excites us to good conduct, and elevates our character by example and precept. If we are removed from this cherished friend, we often think of his influence. Faith causes us to look upon God as our best friend, and it inculcates upon us humble obedience to His righteous commands.

Circumstances of difficulty and danger occur, in which we feel the want of a guide and counsellor. In the reflections to which the situation naturally gives rise, the image of our friend is brought before us, an influence is conveyed, like that which was often produced by his presence and his advice. Then we feel as if he were actually present to give us his counsel and notice our behavior. This impression will be greatly strengthened, if we can think that this absent friend is able to communicate with us. Such is the intercourse of the soul with God. He is present with the mind when, in any situation of duty, distress, or discipline, the man under this exercise of faith, realizes the presence and character of the Deity.

Illustration.—When we ask for something, and confidently expect to receive it, we call that faith. We are told that through faith we are saved. There is a good illustration of this in the case of the woman who lived near the wall of Jericho. It was through her faith that she was saved.

CHAPTER X.

Conscience—Its Functions—Proofs of the Existence of Conscience—The Nature of its Operation—Observations—Conscience and Reason—How Conscience Acts—A Portion of God's Spirit—Right and Wrong—The Influence of Conscience—Knowledge Derived from Conscience—Divine Attributes Compared with the State of Man—The Christian Revelation—Impaired Conscience—Its Influence—Attention—Responsibility for Belief—Moral Emotions and Intellectual Processes—Harmony.

Conscience appears in connection with our moral choices. Having a moral nature, we might judge correctly of the moral conduct of others, but that would not be conscience. But conscience is our moral consciousness; not our outward acts, but our choices. It is at work previous to choice, affirming obligation to choose in accordance with that which is highest; and after choice it gives us, in connection with the ideas of merit and demerit, the feelings of self-approbation, as well as of guilt and remorse.

The moral principle is conscience. The active principles of man are those which decide his conduct as a moral being. There is also a class of feelings, which may be called passive or connecting emotions. Con-

science, like consciousness, is a knowing with. We know our choices, and together with the knowledge of them we have through conscience a knowledge of their moral quality, and so a judgment concerning them. It is therefore strictly personal, and resembles the tribunal of God in judging of choices and motives. Its precise nature and office are given by the Apostle Paul when he says: "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law, are a law unto themselves. Which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another."

When we arrive at such a point as to leave no doubt of our obtaining an object of our desires, this is called confidence; it is one of the elements of faith. If we see no opportunity of obtaining what is desired, it is called despair, and this leads us to abandon the pursuit. If we obtain the object, we feel a thrill of pleasure or joy. When we do not gain what we are seeking, we feel a regret.

If some danger threatens us, we experience a feeling of fear, and we exert ourselves to avert it; if we succeed in overcoming the danger, we experience satisfaction, but if we do not succeed, we have a feeling of sorrow. If the danger seems unavoidable, we suffer from a feeling of despair. Again, when we have acted according to the dictates of conscience, we rejoice in the feeling of self-approbation. Law is one thing and conscience is another.

Without arguing about the propriety of speaking of a separate power or principle, we simply contend that there is a certain mental exercise by which we can feel actions to be right or wrong. This is termed conscience. Our conscience is an element of our moral nature, which may admit of no explanation, and is referable to no other principle than a simple recognition of the facts which force themselves upon the conviction of every man, who looks into the processes of his own soul.

Of the nature of this most important element, conscience, the evidence is entirely within. We appeal to the consciousness of every man, that he perceives a power which, in particular cases, warns him of the conduct that he ought to pursue, and administers a solemn warning when he has departed from the path of rectitude. We look to every one's conscience for the real proof of its existence. If a man does a great crime, he can always feel perfectly sure in his own mind that he is guilty, as his conscience decides this question at once. His judgment also conveys to him an impression, both of the tendencies and certain qualities of actions, though this may be without regard to their final consequences.

The Function of Conscience.—Conscience gives us a perception of the nature and quality of actions, as just or unjust, right or wrong, and a conviction of the duties which a man owes to other men. Conscience is the moral principle. If we listen to it, and go accord-

ing to conscience, we shall have an infallible guide, as a son has the counsel of his father. Although the voice of conscience is inaudible to the outward ear, we feel it saying to us, This is the right way, walk in it. Conscience, therefore, should regulate our actions.

Proofs of Conscience.—That there are certain proofs of the existence of conscience as a distinct principle of our moral constitution, will scarcely be denied. Of the existence and nature of this principle, the evidence is within ourselves. The law is a law within us, by which we become a law to ourselves. It is a fact that there is a moral exercise, by which we feel certain actions to be right, and others to be wrong. It is an element of our moral nature which admits of no analysis.

Conscience is present affirming obligation, and enabling us to judge generally of moral subjects, while in its relations to us personally, and when we come to act, this same moral nature becomes conscience, and bears witness to the moral quality of our choices, and either accuses or excuses us for what we do. Conscience conveys to every one a conviction of what is morally right and wrong, in regard to individual conduct, and concerning the general exercise of the desires and affections. It does this without acquired knowledge, and without reference to any other standard of duty.

To act under the influence of conscience is to perform deeds simply because we feel them to be right, and to abstain from others, because we feel that they

are wrong, without regard to any other impression, or to the consequences of the actions, either to ourselves or to others.

He who, on this principle, performs an action, though it may be highly disagreeable to him, or abstains from another, though it may be desirable, is a conscientious man. The acts are done by the man, the bearing witness, the accusing and excusing are done by the conscience. We know our choices, and also whether they are or are not in accordance with what we believe obligation requires. It is to this last that conscience witnesses, and then either excuses or accuses us.

We can define conscience as an inward feeling, which renders us capable of discerning right from wrong. This conviction is forced upon every man who looks into the recesses of his own soul. In many instances we perceive a warning appeal from conscience that our conduct is straying from the true path, and that feeling imparts to us a solemn admonition to pursue the good way that it dictates. Thus conscience gives man a moral conviction. To be governed by it, is simply to perform an action because it is strictly right, and to abstain from actions, because we feel them to be wrong, however desirable they may seem to the promotion of our happiness.

Thus, under the influence of habit, we are governed by the suggestion of conscience, and freed from those propensities which oppose it. Conscience occupies a place among our moral powers like that which reason holds with regard to the intellectual faculties. Con-

science may be at variance with circumstances, but it is always ready to dictate, and is truly the regulating power that acts upon the desires and affections, as reason acts upon a series of facts, preserving their harmony and order.

Conscience represses our selfish propensities, leading us to the proper view of our interest, and the duty we owe our fellow-mortals. When conscience is disregarded, self-love assumes control, selfish gratifications are indulged without restraint, and thus our momentary impulses are acted upon, without regard to their future results.

It is improper to say that a man is conscientious when he does not act as his conscience prompts him. But if a man does as his moral principle directs him, regardless of apparent personal interests, then he is indeed worthy to be called a conscientious person. Conscience is God's judge placed within us, to control our actions. If we heed its promptings, we shall do our duty.

Observations.—Our conscience is a natural guide to us, in every situation of life in which we may be placed. Some persons do that which they believe to be right, while others think that it is wrong. And sometimes conscience tells us that certain things are wrong, while the law does not censure them. We may, for instance, mention a person who has been educated among the Catholics, and has been taught that it is wrong to eat meat during Lent. He says that his conscience tells

him that it is wrong. Another person, who has been trained among Protestants, was taught that it is right to eat meat during the whole year, and so he believes.

Conscience and Reason.—There is an analogy between conscience and reason. What would this world be, if mankind did not have a conscientious knowledge of right and wrong?—if a man could do everything he wished to do, without that feeling which now and then tells him that he has done wrong? Reason is a great power, and without it a person can not accomplish much. But taking them both together, we think that conscience is the highest faculty of man.

After all, however, we conclude that reason and conscience resemble each other, that they are governing principles in their respective spheres or domains. If we were to train ourselves to it, conscientious obedience would soon become habitual with us, and we should be freer and freer from every feeling and propensity which is opposed to conscience. There is a close analogy between conscience and reason. When we look at them in this light, it makes them both appear more beautiful.

The office of conscience is different from that assigned to it by Mr. Martineau. He says that "when the whole series of springs of action has been experienced, the feeling or 'knowledge with ourselves' of their relative rank constitutes the individual conscience." But this seems to be merely preliminary,

and not the action of conscience at all. Let a man judge as he may of the springs of action, there is no accusing or excusing connected with it. He judges of them as of other things.

How Conscience Acts.—Conscience tells us with correctness when a thing is right or wrong, just or unjust; it does not require a long process of reasoning; for conscience immediately decides. Every man must know whether he chooses and acts in accordance with his sense of obligation. Mr. Martineau places the office of conscience at a point where we judge of springs of action. But we place it at the point where we judge of our choices as conformed or not conformed to the sense of obligation. In his view it has nothing to do with the will; in our view it respects the action of the will.

A Portion of God's Spirit.—By some writers, conscience is said to be a portion of the spirit of God placed within us. Consequently, we can see the near relation in which we stand towards the Deity. All persons, whether they are educated or not, are governed by conscience. A man may be degraded, yet conscience still asserts its power over him; he may, however, refuse to listen to conscience until its warning produces little effect.

Right and Wrong.—If a human being experiences any doubt whether he will be justified in performing a

certain deed, he first asks himself whether it is right or wrong; and if he decides that it is right, then he performs the deed. Taking cognizance only of choices and motives, the judgment of conscience has nothing to do with means, or opportunity, or outward failure or success; and if we deal honestly with it, conscience will anticipate and accord with the judgment of God.

The Influence of Conscience.—Conveying an impression of the moral attributes of the Deity, conscience has a great influence, and this is magnified when it is taken in combination with reason. When the conscience is taken as our guide, we see how every thing was made for our good, how thankful we should be for it, and what is best suited to us as rational and accountable beings. The conscience should be obeyed. It is given in connection with a choice which determines the drift of character.

Knowledge Derived from Conscience.—In a moral being, conscience seems to occupy the same place that reason does in an intellectual person. It is the ruler. There have been some writers who denied the existence of such a principle; but for proof of its existence, we need only ask any honest man if there is not something which tells him that there are certain acts which are right, and others which are wrong. The province of conscience is to show us how to act, in all of our undertakings. By conscience we learn that there are certain duties that we owe to others;

such as, justice and veracity. We learn that we are responsible beings, and must render an account of ourselves.

Farther, we learn that we are, to a certain extent, accountable for the moral condition of those by whom we are immediately surrounded. Again, we learn that we must make our passions yield to the authority of the moral principle. It not only teaches us of our relation to the human race, but conscience also teaches us about our divine Creator.

Combined with reason, conscience teaches us that there is a God. We look at the phenomena of nature, and form a notion of the Great First Cause. He has given us principles of veracity, justice, and benevolence; consequently, we infer that he possesses these attributes in the state of perfection. Conscience is the regulating principle, and if we always follow its dictates, we shall reach the highest moral condition which it is possible for a human being in this state of discipline to attain.

Comparison of the Divine Attributes with the State of Man.—By a simple step of reasoning, which conveys an impression of absolute conviction, we conclude that He who formed us with these feelings, possesses in his own character corresponding moral attributes, which, while they resemble in kind, must infinitely exceed in degree those qualities in the wisest and best of men. In our actual observation of mankind, we see these attributes impaired in their exercise

by human weakness, distorted by human passion, and impeded in their operation by personal wants and selfish interests.

Therefore, we conclude that the Almighty is perfect in the exercise of all moral attributes, and that he takes the most rigid estimate of any infringement of them by men. As we view such a Being, apart from any inferior creature, all seems harmony; we have only to contemplate him as high and holy, enjoying perfect happiness in his own spotless attributes. But when we view him in relation to man, in that state tainted deeply with moral evil, a difficulty of an appalling magnitude arises.

There is ample scope now, we perceive, for the exercise of the supreme holiness and veracity; so God appears with sublime majesty, in his exalted character as the moral Governor of the universe, full of mercy and forgiveness. In a moral Governor of infinite perfection, there can be neither ignorance of facts nor change of purpose.

Difficulties.—All difficulties which arise from the foregoing comparison are removed by the Christian revelation. The soundest inductions of philosophy applied to the actual state of man, bring us to this momentous conclusion; but the highest efforts of human science fail to reconcile justice with mercy. It is in our utmost need that we are met by the dictates of revelation, and we are called upon to humble the pride of human reason before that display of the har-

mony and integrity of the divine character. We there learn truths far beyond the inductions of human science, and the utmost reaches of human thought; that an atonement between God and man is made, a sacrifice is offered and accepted; and that the exercise of forgiveness is consistent with the perfections of the Deity.

Thus, by a process of the mind itself, which seems to present every element of fair and logical exactness, we arrive at a full conviction of the necessity and the moral probability of that truth, which forms the great peculiarity of the Christian revelation. These facts are impressed upon us with renewed power, when we fix our attention upon them in all of their bearings.

The truths which are revealed to the Christian, show him that there is a Being of infinite wisdom and purity; also that man is a poor, weak, and sinful creature. But men, who know nothing of practical religion, think that they are perfect, and thus they deceive themselves.

Impaired Conscience.—A mental process has been observed, by which the regulating power of conscience is impaired or lost. When we endeavor to trace the manner in which men have departed so widely from the high pattern of perfection, we arrive at moral phenomena, of which we can offer no explanation. A problem of greater importance, is to mark the process by which conscience ceases to be the regulating prin-

ciple of the character, and this is a simple and legitimate object of philosophical observation.

Indeed, we can view it only as a matter of fact, without being able to refer it to any special principle. The fact to which we allude is a certain relation between the truths which are designed to act upon us as moral causes, and the mental emotions which ought to result from them. If the due harmony between these truths and emotions is patiently cultivated, the result is a sound moral condition. But every time this harmony is violated, a morbid influence is introduced, which gains strength in each succeeding violation.

If this tendency of the emotions is diligently observed, that is, if the emotion of compassion is properly cultivated, for instance, the result is active benevolence; but if the emotion is violated, its influence is diminished, and a character of cold, barren selfishness is produced. We should always pay careful and strict attention to conscience, and then it is sure to guide and direct us in the right way.

The Influence of Impaired Conscience.—This influence acting upon the judgment in regard to moral truth, consists in a distortion of the understanding itself regarding the first great moral principles. Conscience being dethroned, there next arises a desire to discover a view of things more in accordance with the corrupt feelings. This is followed by a corresponding train of reflections opposed to the truth. This process, advancing step by step, terminates in moral anarchy.

Attention.—Moral decision is greatly influenced by attention. Before the decision is made in regard to a subject, we should always listen attentively to both sides of the question, and then form our conclusion. We should not allow prejudice, money, or friendship to pervert our decision, but we should act with justice. Besides, we should not form our opinions too hastily, but take the necessary time to give each sound argument its due consideration. Mistakes in judgment are easily made, but they are not always so easily corrected.

Responsibility for Belief.—Man is responsible for his belief. If he could not distinguish the right from the wrong, and had no possible means of finding out the truth, then he would not be held accountable. His belief is influenced very much by education and circumstances; but, by the assistance of his own reason and conscience, man can establish belief of the truth, and for this he is responsible. Of course, this process belongs to a sane mind and a sound moral constitution.

When the truth is presented, we have the power to accept it or to reject it. If the will were restrained here by necessity, man would be little more than a machine. Freedom of choice, however, belongs to man, and hence he is responsible, not only for his beliefs, but also for his thoughts, his words, and his actions.

Moral Emotions and Intellectual Processes.—Between the moral emotions and the voluntary intellectual processes, there exists an important relation.

These emotions are, properly speaking, not the objects of will or volition, nor do they arise directly at our bidding, but according to our constitution. They are the natural or established result of certain intellectual processes, and in one sense, they are the actions of ourselves, and are voluntary. The emotions of compassion and benevolence, for example, are the natural result of the sight, or even the description of distress, and the primary steps of this process are entirely within our power to perform them, if we will.

We can visit the afflicted family, listen to their tale of distress, and consider their circumstances; that is, we can give our attention to them in such a way that the natural effect will be produced upon our moral feelings. If sympathy does not follow this course, after some repetition, it terminates in selfishness.

Harmony.—By our intellectual powers we receive a subject into the mind, and by reasoning we determine whether the subject has a true or false foundation, and we place it in its true light within our own minds, and afterwards in the mind of others. Without justice, we should, in all probability, not place this subject in its true light, and without truth of purpose, often when we know exactly how an affair ought to appear, we put it in another light. Without the moral principle, our intellectual powers would be unrestrained. Hence we discover a beautiful harmony among all of our moral and mental powers.

CHAPTER XI.

THE ORIGIN OF VIRTUE AND VICE—CONSCIENCE—THE SYSTEM OF MANDEVILLE—CLARKE AND WOLLASTON—UTILITY—THE SELFISH SYSTEM—SELFISHNESS—PALEY'S SYSTEM—DEFECT OF MORAL SYSTEMS—BARBAROUS NATIONS—THEORY OF SYMPATHY—THE USE OF SYMPATHY—REASON IN MORAL DECISIONS—CORRUPTION OF CONSCIENCE—HARMONY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS—CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER.

The Origin of Virtue and Vice.—When we contemplate men's actions in relation to each other, we pronounce some deeds right and others wrong. We first determine what the intentions of the actor were. If we find that he intended evil, we blame him; while, on the contrary, if his intentions were good, we praise him. There is a line of conduct to which we ourselves and others are bound by strong obligation. If we observe it, we are virtuous; if we do not, we are vicious. There is a moral principle within each one of us, that decides the good or bad quality of an action.

If we obey conscience, our conduct will be morally right; for, at all times, unless it has been debased, it dictates to us precisely what our actions ought to be. Mr. Hume supports the theory that whatever action is useful is virtuous. The objection to this is, that it

also applies to inanimate objects. Mr. Hume, in order to obviate this difficulty, said that the sense of utility must be combined with a feeling of approbation.

Conscience.—We find the origin of our idea of virtue and vice in conscience. A person may be virtuous while he does not even so much as know the meaning of virtue. Conscience has been called the voice of God whispering in our souls. We find ourselves in the midst of good and evil, but it is our duty to choose the good and refuse the evil, knowing that we are wrong every time that we go out of the line of conduct which conscience indicates. Obeying conscience, we know that we are acting in a becoming manner.

The System of Mandeville.—Mr. Mandeville says that man naturally seeks his own gratifications, without any regard to the happiness of other men. But legislators found that it would be necessary to induce man in some way to surrender a portion of his personal gratification for the good of humanity. Legislators made certain laws for the general good, and they flattered mankind into the belief that it was praiseworthy to observe them, and noble to sacrifice a certain portion of their own pleasures for the good of other persons.

"What we call virtue," says Mr. Mandeville, "resolves itself into the love of praise." Laws are intended for the public good, and while they are in force, it is the duty of every good citizen to obey them. But no

laws can alter, and no statutes can modify those great principles of moral conduct, which are engraved upon the consciences of all classes of the human race. Kings may make laws, but they can not create virtue. The system of Mr. Mandeville ascribes our impressions of moral rectitude entirely to the enactments of law-makers. Man, he says, seeks only his gratifications, without any regard to the happiness of others. But legislators found that it would be necessary to induce man in some way to surrender a portion of his gratifications for the benefit of others. To do this with any degree of success, the legislators were obliged to offer man some kind of recompense. This is Mr. Mandeville's theory of morals.

The System of Clarke and Wollaston.—In a theory supported by these eminent men, virtue was considered to depend upon a conformity of the conduct to a certain sense of the fitness of things, or their truth. The meaning of this is rather obscure. It refers the essence of virtue to a revelation perceived by the process of reason, with the belief of the impressions being universal. It may therefore be held as at variance with God's essential attributes, the effect of which is the general happiness of his creatures. Whatever is right is also expedient for man, but the converse of this proposition by no means follows, that what men think expedient necessarily comes to be right. According to this theory, virtue was considered to depend upon an agreement of the conduct with a certain sense of

the fitness of things, or the truth of things. We are at a loss to understand the meaning of this definition; but it does not imply that the essence of virtue is universal.

The System of Utility.—This theory of morals is supported by Mr. David Hume. In accordance with it, we estimate the virtue of an action and an agent entirely by their usefulness. This is objected to on the ground already stated, that it holds good for both animate and inanimate beings. This theory holds that every thing which is expedient is right, and that all things which are right must be expedient. Partly this is so. Every thing that is right is expedient, but every thing that is expedient is not always right. It was, however, ably supported by Mr. Hume.

According to this theory of utility, as advocated by Mr. Hume, we determine the value or virtue of an action, as well as of an agent, by the principle of their usefulness. Mr. Hume refers all of our mental impressions to the two principles of reason and taste. Reason here is the knowledge of truth and falsehood. Taste gives an impression of pleasure or pain, and becomes a motive of action, while reason does not thus act.

An obvious objection to the doctrine of utility is, that it might be applied to a printing-press, as well as to a meritorious person. To obviate this objection, Mr. Hume was driven to a distinction, which, in fact, amounted to giving up the argument, that the sense of utility must be combined with a feeling of approba-

tion. This leads us back to the previous question, on what the feeling of approbation is founded.

This important distinction has been well stated by Professor Mills of Oxford. He defines morality to be "an obedience to the law and constitution of man's nature, assigned him by the Deity, in conformity with his own essential attributes, the effect of which is the general happiness of his creatures." To the theory of taste, Mr. Hume refers our impressions of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. His definition of right resolves itself into the impression of usefulness.

The Selfish System.—The selfish system of morals, according to the statement of its advocates, is a desire to promote man's own interest. This theory has appeared from an early period, in the history of moral science, in various forms. Mr. Hobbes was the most remarkable promoter of it in modern times. According to his doctrine, man is influenced entirely to promote his own interest; and that which does so, he considers as right, and that which does not, as wrong. That which is supposed, may be considered as contradicted by facts; for even in our own experience, the pleasure that attends an act of kindness in ourselves, as well as our approbation of it in others, is diminished by the impression that there is a selfish purpose to be answered by the action.

Virtuous conduct imparts gratification of the highest kind, and it promotes the true interest of the agent. There is a modification of the selfish system, which

attempts to avoid its offensive aspect by a singular and circuitous chain of moral emotions. This may be considered as an ingenious play upon words.

Selfishness.—We become selfish when we let our affections take the wrong course, when we do not control them, but allow them to centre upon ourselves, to the exclusion of everybody else. We think only of self, and do not care for our fellow-men. If an affair is to our own interest, we do not care if it ruins men in their business, their reputation, or in any other way.

The System of Paley.—Differences of opinion have sprung from this system. Dr. Paley says that virtue is doing good to all mankind, according to the will of God and for everlasting happiness. He says that the will of God is made known to us partly by revelation, and partly by the works of nature. He thinks that God wishes and wills the happiness of his creatures. If we wish to arrive at the will of God, he says, we must see if the action promotes happiness. His conclusion is, that whatever is expedient is right. We object to this theory, because it gives right action no higher motive than simply that of receiving a reward.

The Defect of Moral Systems.—Primarily the defect of many systems of morals is, in their not acknowledging the supreme authority of conscience. All theories of morals that do not acknowledge the power of conscience, as the regulating principle, are open to

objections. It is clear that persons do not have the same opinions. What one man thinks right, another condemns as wrong. Besides, if man formed the code by which he is to be judged, it is natural that he would be lenient towards himself.

Barbarous Nations.—We can readily see that the moral feelings of barbarous nations are uncultivated. They are unacquainted with the divine revelation, and they have imperfect notions of God; hence, we do not expect to find that their opinions agree with those of men who have received the blessings of sound moral and religious instruction.

The System of Sympathy.—Dr. Adam Smith advanced the system of sympathy. Our sympathy can not be supposed to constitute an action right or wrong, but it enables us to apply to individual cases the moral quality derived from conscience, and, in doing so, to clear our own judgment from the blinding influence of those selfish feelings, by which we are so apt to be misled. In estimating our own conduct, we apply to it those conclusions which we have made with regard to the conduct of our associates. Or we imagine others applying the same process in regard to us, and we reflect how our conduct would appear to an impartial observer. If we sympathize with the feelings and intentions of the agent, we approve of his conduct as right; if not, we consider it as wrong. We observe our feelings in regard to the conduct of others, even when we are not

personally concerned. According to Dr. Adam Smith, it is required for our moral sentiments respecting an action, that we enter into the feelings both of the agent and of him to whom the action relates.

The Use of Sympathy.—If it were not for our sympathizing with persons in distress, we should be of little service to humanity. When we hear an account of sorrow and do not sympathize with the sufferer, we are not prepared to use our ability towards relieving the distress. Tender sympathy is a flower worthy to bloom in the Paradise of God.

The Province of Reason.—In moral decisions, reason has its province of comparing thoughts and things with each other. It should be cultivated, in order to render us wise in our conclusions. For instance, in feeling an ardent wish to promote the interest or relieve the distress of a human being, we must seek the most effectual means of giving our assistance. Frequently our intentions are good, but we err in judgment. We must, by study, learn to adapt ourselves to persons of different temperaments, and then we can readily understand what each will accept. We must, in a measure, learn from experience, and importance should be attached to the principles from which actions derive their character of uprightness. Reason should be applied to their tendencies, while we must reflect what would be the consequence and the propriety of such actions. Especially is this the case with our

affections, seeking the best modes of exercising them, and in many cases deciding whether we should exercise them at all. Benevolence is a noble trait in a person's character, but let us take pains to see that our compassion is worthily bestowed. Prudence will show that if one is unworthy, we must exert ourselves for the most deserving person.

It is hard for a strictly conscientious man to act, under circumstances in which his duty seems to interfere with that of another person. We should bring reason to bear in deciding whether it is a real duty; but at all times, we should proceed upon a calm consideration of the motives by which we are influenced.

The Corruption of Conscience.—Here we make a few remarks on the observations of some late writers respecting the corruption of conscience. Those writers to whom we refer, do not admit the authority of conscience. They seem to refer our moral impressions entirely to the will of the Deity, as made known to us by revelation. This power of the soul, conscience, is derived in one of two ways. It is either received from the divine Being, or it is the result of our speculations concerning utility; but some writers reject this system. The theory of which they write, is the same that we call conscience; they know it by different names, and the controversy resolves itself into a dispute about a name.

Harmony of the Moral Feelings.—If a truthful

person tells us that an affair is right, we are likely to believe him; because we have confidence in what he tells us. Though, to have harmony among our moral feelings, we should always let conscience be our guide. Otherwise this harmony is disturbed and our moral nature suffers.

Consistency of Character.—True consistency of character is the result of a regulated condition of the moral feelings, and it serves to promote due attention to the various responsibilities connected with the situation in which the individual is placed. It does so by continually causing man to raise his views to the Eternal One, who is witness of all he does, and to whom every man is responsible for his actions. Consistency of character helps to keep man from all those partial and one-sided courses of conduct to which men are led by the mere love of praise, and by any of the other inferior motives, which are closely connected with self-love.

Religious pretension often shows itself by external demonstrations, while there are not the corresponding feelings within the soul. From such inconsistency of character arises an evil that has an injurious effect upon many persons. There may be much pretension where there is little, if any, real feeling. But we must not infer from this that there is no real virtue; for such persons as these pretenders are compelled to have something real and genuine to counterfeit. By a slight gilding, articles of a trifling value may be made to assume the appearance of gold, but on this account, it

would not be reasonable to say that there is no gold. There must be something valuable before it is imitated. If there were no sincere virtues, the hypocrite would have no necessity to assume good qualities, which he does not possess. Again, the imitations that we notice convince us that true virtue must be a reality.

Consistency of character arises from a due harmony of the moral feelings. When all of the desires and affections are in perfect unison, and the moral condition is not impaired, we may rely upon uniformity of conduct in such a person. We may, to a certain extent, know how he would act under given circumstances. But in most cases, there is some predominating affection which usurps an undue influence. This consistency of character is opposed to a depraved, distorted, warped disposition, which does not make a distinction between the truth and falsehood. It is the business of a rational and free being not to create any thing as God did, but to construct a course of conduct. And this he is to do from the same principle, and on the same model, as God has constructed the universe. The principle is love. This we learn from the Word of God. The model is a variety of forces, broader and less broad, which may be represented by a pyramid, the forces being regulated in their relation by the law of limitation. This we learn from the works of God, or Nature.

CHAPTER XII.

Man's Relation to God—An Appeal to the Deity—A Close Relation—Justice and Benevolence—View of the Divine Character—Moral Feelings—The Divine Presence — Submission — Our Moral Imperfection — Gratitude, Affection, and Love—Character—Means of Cultivating a Sense of the Divine Presence—Habitual Effort—Faith—Its Province—Illustration —Truths which are Faith's Object—The Influence of Faith — Moral Condition — Faith's Province in Christianity—Christianity and Moral Philosophy—The Will of God—Common Sense—Growth in Beauty.

Those affections and acts which are involved in worship are conditioned on all that is below them. From this it will follow that worship is the highest act which man can perform, and that his nature does not reach its full expression without that.

The Moral Relation of Man towards the Deity.—Some considerations lead us to the duties which a man owes to his fellow-men, while others call our attention to that homage of the mind and of the soul, which man owes peculiarly to God. For the duties to our fellow-beings, we are equally responsible to God, as the moral Governor of the universe, but their

immediate reference is to our associations with other men. Still there are duties which respect our relation to the Deity himself, and therefore consist, in a great measure, in the purity and devotedness of the soul. In human systems of ethics, attention has been chiefly directed to the obligations of social and relative morality, but the two classes are closely associated in the sacred writings, and the sound condition of the moral feelings is pointed out as that acquirement which, along with corresponding integrity of character, qualifies man in an especial manner for acceptance with the Deity.

An Appeal to the Deity.—In all man's relations to his fellow-creatures, we may appeal to God as the governing power, but there is a nearer relation. It is not surprising that, as the Creator of man's wonderful body and mind, God should have direct intercourse with the mind, and even in secret see into its workings, and hence the great importance of keeping the mind perfectly free from impure thoughts. God has placed conscience within us, to let us know that man has fallen, and that he may realize his near relation to Deity previous to the fall; also that man may approach as near to perfection as possible.

A Close Relation.—Man is closely related to the Deity, his governor and protector, who has made his laws and caused them to be written in his book, in order that they may be known and obeyed. He gives

us strength to perform our duties, if we come to him in the hour of need. He leaves the way open to us; but if we persist in doing wrong, and will not ask his forgiveness when we have sinned, we incur his displeasure.

Justice and Benevolence. — In contemplating man's relation to the Deity, there are three great facts to be considered; justice, benevolence, and conformity to duty. We are led to study our duty to God, to our fellow-men, and to ourselves. Man judges by the outward appearance, but God judges by the inner state of the heart. If a man loves God, relies upon him, and obeys his laws, God will stand to such a man in the same relation that a father occupies to his son.

The Divine Character.—In reference to this relation, when we view the Divine character, we look upon God as our great moral Governor, an infinite, self-existent, and eternal Being. We see his superintending care and goodness, in the way that he has made ample provision for supplying the wants, and ministering to the comfort of all his creatures. We contemplate God as a high and holy being, endowed with unlimited power and wisdom. God is a Spirit, infinitely wise, holy, just, and merciful. But when we compare him with the people upon earth, he appears in sublime and glorious majesty in his exalted character as a moral Governor.

He created us, hence he knows, not only all our actions, but our most secret thoughts. God looks upon

the heart, and knows it altogether. A subject more interesting can not be found than the condition of the heart, after which every man ought to seek when he knows that he is always exposed to the inspection of the Almighty.

Moral Feelings.—That regulation of the moral feelings which ought to arise out of man's relation to God, implies sacred reverence for the character of the Deity. It is opposed to anything that will weaken the reverential feelings due to the character and name of the Almighty. There is a state of mind which the moral feelings approve; this appears in two relations, one referring to the Deity, and the other to our fellow-men. The first is an effort to have every desire, affection, thought, and emotion of the soul in submission to the Creator. The second division includes the cultivation of feelings of kindness towards all men with the love of peace and truth.

From these two mental conditions must spring a character distinguished alike for piety towards God, and for active usefulness to men. He who earnestly cultivates this purity within, feels that he requires watchfulness. He knows also that he can look up with confidence and hope when, under a sense of moral weakness, he asks for the powerful aid of the Deity.

Habitual Effort to Cultivate a Sense of the Divine Presence.—This implies reverence and love for the Deity, while it is opposed to every kind of pro-

faneness, or anything by which one might weaken in himself, or in others, the reverential feeling due towards the character and attributes of God. This must not only be extended to the outward conduct, but it must reach the inmost affections of the soul. A benevolent regard for our fellow-men may be checked from producing exemplary conduct, while envy and hatred remain in the soul.

It is upon the mind that cherishes malevolent passions, with impure desires and imaginations, that God looks with feelings of displeasure and condemnation. Amid the various pursuits of ordinary life, we are too apt to lose sight of those duties and responsibilities, which attend a state of moral discipline, and that culture of the soul which is required, as a preparation for the future state of existence to which we are hastening.

There may be original principles in our nature which lead to a certain exercise of justice, veracity, and benevolence, independently of any knowledge of divine authority. We may see also that, as the necessity in nature that is before freedom is necessary, in order that man may rule over nature, so also is the necessity after freedom of consequences within himself necessary in order that God may rule over him, by any system of natural consequences, or indeed by reward and punishment in any form.

Submission.—Humble and willing submission is due to the appointments of Providence, as parts of a great system, which is regulated by infinite wisdom

Any man who bears upon his mind this sublime impression, has learned to contemplate the Almighty One as disposing of the events of this world, assigning to every creature the place that he occupies. He sees that duties belong to the position, and they call for the cultivation of moral qualities adapted to the circumstances.

Whether the positions are those of comfort, influence, or wealth, solemn obligations arise out of the means of usefulness which these command. Such a submission of the human soul to the appointments of God does not preclude the use of all legitimate means for improving our condition, or for preventing and removing distress. Our freedom lies between two forms of necessity, the one necessary to the existence of freedom, the other to the moral government of free beings.

Moral Imperfection.—Man experiences the sense of moral imperfection, of guilt, then he makes supplication for mercy, with a full reliance upon divine aid. This sense of our own imperfections, of course, leads us to realize our condition, and when we are convinced of it, we plead for mercy. And as God has told us that when we rightly ask for mercy, it shall be given unto us, we expect aid from him, knowing that we can do nothing that is meritorious without his guidance.

Gratitude and Love.—The sense of gratitude, affection, and love towards the Deity, is produced by his kindness and his love for us. He is the giver of

all good, and is our daily preserver and benefactor; he is merciful and gracious, slow to anger. The character of the Messiah is often spoken of as a matter of mere historical interest, but he presents the purest and most perfect example that was ever known to the world. He went about doing good, healing the sick, giving sight to the blind, teaching pure morality, and then giving his life for the whole world.

It is this sense of gratitude, affection, and love that causes us, while in sickness, to suffer so long, without murmuring, but in perfect submission to God's will. The Deity's character corresponds with that high tone of morals enjoined in the sacred writings. Its elements are defined and clear. Would we seek to estimate its sublimity and its truth, we have only to compare it with those distorted and temporizing systems, which have resulted from the inventions of men.

Conduct and Character.—If we would have our conduct and character adapted to the right condition of moral feelings, there should be a due regulation of the desires and affections. We must patiently submit to the will of the Almighty, and suppress every selfish feeling. Such a character as this corresponds with that described in the Holy Scriptures. The word and the works of God give us the law of conduct. Our conduct is to spring from rational love; the man, meanwhile, being brought under obligations.

Means of Cultivating a Sense of the Divine

Presence.—To cultivate a feeling of the presence of the Creator, we must have reverence for his character, and avoid every thing that would tend to the contrary. We must pay strict attention to the nature of our thoughts, and always entertain pure meditations; for evil thoughts have a bad influence, and draw our attention away from the contemplation of the character of the Deity. If we think of him, we shall see how weak and sinful we are; this will be accompanied by a feeling of humility, and a desire to be more like him. In this way, though little by little, our characters will be improved.

Habitual Effort.—There should be the habitual effort to cultivate a sense of the Divine presence, and by this to regulate the moral feelings and character. A character thus finished will constitute one of the highest in the scale of moral beings, where there is a constant endeavor to shape the character so as to make it as nearly as possible like that of the Giver of all good gifts. He, who sees in secret, is the source of all goodness, knows all things, and must be perfect in all his attributes.

The Operation of Faith.—In order to become good Christians, we must first repent of all our sins, and then have faith. This faith is a compound operation, which can be analyzed. It is composed of reason, attention, and a modification of conception. Reason finds out the truth of all the statements which come

into the mind, and can in any way act upon the moral feelings. The province of attention must next be examined as one of the elements of faith. Assisted by reason it is to direct the mind closely to the truths, so as to see clearly their relations and tendencies.

By the last process the truths are brought before us in such a manner as to appear real. In these ways, truths relating to things for which we have not the evidence of our senses, or referring to events which are future, but fully expected to happen, are kept before the mind, and influence the moral feelings as well as the character, in the same manner as if the facts believed were actually seen, or the events expected were taking place in our view. The real definition of faith given to us by Saint Paul is, that "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen." The substance is that which gives things subsistence in the views and feelings of the soul, and leads it to treat them as if they were real. While the evidence produces conviction of their reality and importance; that they actually are as they are represented. Faith is a glorious reality and mightily efficacious.

The Province of Faith in the Philosophy of the Moral Feelings.—Intimately connected with this subject, also, is a remarkable principle in our constitution, formerly referred to; the relation between certain facts or truths and the moral emotions which arise from them, according to the chain of se-

quences which has been established in the economy of the mind. A very close connection exists between our intellectual habits and our moral feelings, which unquestionably leads to consequences of the utmost practical moment. Though we have little voluntary power over our moral emotions, we have a power over the intellectual processes with which these are associated. We can direct the mind to truths, and we can cherish trains of thought, which are designed to produce correct moral feelings; besides, we can avoid or banish mental images and trains of thought which have an opposite tendency. This is the power over the succession of our thoughts, the due exercise of which forms so marked a feature of a well-regulated mind, in regard to intellectual culture.

Illustration.—Without faith we can not be saved from the power of sin. If we did not believe the sacred Scriptures, it is clear that we could not have faith in them. When God told an Israelite king to do a certain thing, he obeyed, but lacked faith, and so he was punished. The woman of Jericho was saved by faith. She took some spies and hid them when they were in danger, and upon their departure they promised to save her and her family when the city was captured.

Truths Which are Faith's Object.—The human mind is ever and restlessly breaking loose from the present and all things perishable about it, and grasping

after something in the future distance. Search after happiness is the great law of human nature, and in all the wanderings of the mind in search of something that can be relied upon as the foundation of unalloyed happiness, it instinctively turns to the lessons taught us in early life, which are truths recorded in the sacred writings of divine origin. After careful research, and study of the truths found in the Scriptures, we are convinced of the certainty of the existence of an all-wise God; also, that our hopes of true happiness are based upon the laws and provisions offered by inspired authors. The more we search, and the more thought we give to the Word of God, the more convinced we are of the truth of the Christian religion, as taught by our Saviour while on earth. These truths being established in our minds, we are naturally led to an abiding faith in God, to whom we look for the blessings of this life, and the rewards promised in the life to come. So the establishment of these truths in our minds has the tendency of purifying our conduct in a moral point of view, thereby securing to us that great boon—happiness, for which the mind is seeking. This is a happiness which is both perfect and everlasting.

The Influence of Faith.—But, independent of our conviction of an actual communication from the Deity, there is a power in the mind itself, which draws down upon it an influence of the process which we call faith. It may be illustrated by an impression which many persons must have experienced. Thus, for an

example, let us suppose that we have a friend of exalted intelligence and virtue, who has often exercised over us a commanding influence, restraining us from wrong pursuits, and exciting us to good conduct. This friend is our counsellor. Such is the communication of the soul with God.

Faith's Influence on the Moral Condition.— These truths are not the visions of enthusiasm, neither are they the result of any process of reasoning by which different men may arrive at various conclusions. They force themselves upon our conviction with a power which we can not put away from us, when we think about the solemn inquiry, What we are, why we are here, whither we are tending, and what is God? In the writings of the Bible, these truths are detailed and illustrated in a connected and harmonious manner, and they are forced upon our minds by a revelation from the Deity himself.

But the principles there disclosed meet with an impression in our moral constitution, which pleads with authority for their truth. It is the province of faith to keep these facts ever before our minds, and it causes them to influence the feelings and the conduct, as if they were objects of sense, as if the Deity, in all the purity of his character, were actually disclosed to our view. The man who thus feels the power of these principles, and exhibits their influence upon his conduct, is a person who lives by faith.

When under this mental exercise a man brings him-

self into the immediate presence of the eternal One, when a man arraigns himself, as it were, before the bar of the omniscient Judge, when man places before himself that future state which extends into endless existence, a train of feelings must arise in his mind to which he was a stranger, so long as he placidly resigned himself to the sole influence of things presented by the senses.

It is the province of faith to keep constantly before us the revelations from the Deity, and to cause them to influence the feelings and the conduct, as if they were objects of sense, as if God, in all his perfect attributes, were visibly before our view. When under this impression a man brings himself into the presence of God, he views the Deity as a being of infinite holiness, as one who has been, all the man's life, the witness of his conduct, and who knows all the secrets of his character. Such a man will try then to improve his moral condition, so that he can better undergo the inspection of the divine Being.

Faith in Christianity.—That is a solemn hour, when we, after retiring from the tumult of life, ask ourselves about our moral condition, What has been our occupation in this life that will soon end? And then, are we willing to unfold to the incomprehensible One our moral character? But as he sees us, do we think, when the full splendor of his eye is upon us, and we are called into the presence of his unerring purity, that we shall be ready to answer for our conduct?

Faith occupies a prominent place in the Christian doctrine, and it is interesting to get a clear view of its nature. It is a process that all feel, but few can fully define. One who believes that he will receive the gifts of God, and that the Deity is a holy, just, and merciful God, will be saved through his faith. When a sick man hears that there is one to administer something for his comfort, if there is virtue in the remedy, if he has confidence in the person, he will apply for the remedy; he receives it, and thus his faith saves him; because, by means of it, he sought the offered aid. But were he merely to admit the fact, his belief would avail him nothing. Thus faith unfolds a dispensation of peace, by which the Deity offers mercy, forgiveness, and an influence from himself, which has power to purify the moral being. So these blessings are conferred upon men who believe; and they are the persons who are fully convinced of their guilt, and who conceive their utter inability to rescue themselves, and willingly confess the power that God has of overcoming their sinful tendencies—their faith saves them. A man asks the promised aid, and receives it. We shall not seek the remedy, if we do not have confidence in its good effects. Man knows of his moral condition from the voice of conscience. We know the sincerity of God's offer from the impression of the unchangeable attributes of the Deity, and if we come to him with the hope of acceptance, we are required to come in the assurance of faith.

Harmony.—Christian truth and the moral feelings accord with each other, and there is a beautiful harmony between them, as is shown by careful examination. The Christian finds it difficult at first, perhaps, to imitate his great exemplar; but after a while, advancing step by step, he approaches the perfect light. Man undoubtedly owes much of his present and future happiness to the great truths of morality and religion.

The will of God is communicated to us immediately through our conscience. As has already been said, conscience is a portion of God's spirit placed within us, and it is not to direct, but it is to be directed by him, and by this direction we are guided. This mediate or immediate communication of the will of God to man is a problem which has caused no little controversy among philosophers. However, it is plain that God does reveal his will to man for the purposes of instruction, reproof, and guidance.

Common Sense.—This common sense is a quality of the mind, not so common as the words imply. Many claim it, who have no title to its possession. It is a high standard of mental worth. The brain coin that bears its imprint, has a par value wherever man is governed by pure reason. It interprets law and defines justice. Its precious beam is to the scientist what the compass is to the mariner. When men cut loose from its anchorage, they are lost in the sea of speculation. Truth inscribes it on her banner of beauty, and under

its folds marshals her armies of peasants, princes, and potentates.

Growth in Beauty.—Human beings may outgrow disease and become healthful, by proper attention to their physical constitution. By moderate daily exercise and suitable food, any person who has no hereditary disease may become strong in limb and muscle. But is there any process by which people may grow beautiful? Live as we may, age dims the lustre of the eye, and pales the flush of the cheek, while infirmities mar the human form divine. But while this is true, dim as the eye is, pallid and sunken as may be the face of beauty, frail and feeble that once strong, erect, and symmetrical form, the immortal soul, just fledging its wings for Heaven, may look out through those faded windows as beautiful as a dewdrop on a summer's morning, as melting as the tears that glisten in affection's eye; by growing kindly, by cultivating sympathy with all mankind, by cherishing forbearance towards the follies and foibles of our race, and feeding day by day on that love of God and man which lifts us from the brute, and makes us akin to angels.

APPENDIX.

POLITICAL ECONOMY—DOMESTIC ECONOMY—ÆSTHETICS—NATURAL THEOLOGY—EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.

Political Economy.—This is the science which teaches the laws that regulate the production, distribution, and exchange of wealth. Any thing for which something can be had in exchange is wealth, and a commodity is wealth in a tangible form. Capital is wealth saved, and used in production.

Air and water may, or may not, be considered as wealth; when they are free, or we are free to use them, then they are not wealth; but when we are compelled to give any thing for them, then they are wealth. Water in a diving-bell is worse than useless, but to a thirsty man in the desert it has a great value. A man's money locked up without interest is not productive capital. Political economy relates to public wealth, and domestic economy belongs to home affairs. Examples from this science are advantageously used as illustrations of problems in ethics, or moral philosophy.

To produce wealth, the three things required are—natural agents, capital, and labor. Natural agents, which are limited in quantity, are wealth, and those

which are practically unlimited are not wealth. Capital is divided into fixed and circulating, but the proportion of fixed to circulating capital depends upon the way in which capital is used. The stock of capital is kept up by constant reproduction, while the amount of capital used measures the amount of labor employed.

Domestic Economy relates to the management of wealth at home, the manner in which to gain wealth, and when it is obtained, to take care of, and use property to advantage. Wealth is any thing which can be used to produce more wealth; such as corn, houses, land, and money. Capital is wealth that is used to produce more wealth; thus, the sum of one thousand dollars, if put out at interest, is productive capital. The principles of political and domestic economy are much the same, though political economy may be said to embrace domestic economy.

Æsthetics.—Æsthetics is the science of the beautiful. The true is the conformity of thoughts with things, the beautiful is the consummation of the true, and the good is the consummation of the beautiful. When an object is regular, bounded by systematic outlines, and makes an agreeable impression upon us, we say that it is beautiful. A beautiful person has features which have pleasant outline and surface. The beautiful extends its domain through the physical, the intellectual, the moral, and the religious worlds. God is the source of the true, the beautiful, and the good.

Natural Theology.—If we were inclined to doubt the possibility of a future state of existence, we find in nature much to overcome this uncertainty, and to convince us of the truth. This science, from nature, proves the existence of God ; it shows also that he must be infinitely wise, good, and holy. In nature we see design, and hence there must be a designer; we see justice, mercy, and goodness, but he who bestows these virtues must possess them in an infinite degree, and the infinitely just, merciful, and good Being is God.

In all cases wherein the mind feels itself in danger of being confounded by variety, it is sure to rest upon a few strong points, or perhaps upon a single instance. Among a multitude of proofs, there is one which is the strongest. If we observe in any argument that hardly two minds fix upon the same instance, the diversity of choice shows the strength of the argument, because it shows the number and competition of the examples.

Evidences of Christianity.—The New Testament gives internal evidences of Christianity, and there are also external or historical evidences. Powerful evidences of Christianity, or the religion of the New Testament, are afforded by prophecy, miracles, the spread of the gospel, and the fruits of Christianity, as they are exemplified in the lives of true believers. These evidences show the divine authority of Christianity, and the inspiration of the Scriptures. We have not only a religion revealed from God, but an infallible

expression of its doctrine and duties. We have the guide, as well as the way to everlasting bliss, both equally certain, equally divine. Let us be thankful for such unspeakable gifts. Next to the mercy of a Saviour, able and ready to save to the uttermost all who come unto God by him, is the book of the inspiration of God, which, as a lamp to our feet, and a light to our path, conducts us to such a Friend, and teaches us the way of salvation.

INDEX.

THE END.

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

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